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RELIEF UNDER A DEFECTIVE
MUNICIPAL CONTRACT IN OHIO
by George D. Vaubel*
Introduction
T HE RAPIDLY INCREASING TEMPO of concern for urban prob-
lems is giving rise to an ever-expanding range of literature
devoted to their possible solution. Even in what might be con-
sidered a backwater of interest, the problems of municipal con-
tracting, periodic examinations have taken place. Unfortunately,
these have been undertaken almost exclusively by legal com-
mentators, as most courts have been reluctant to make reassess-
ments in a field in which the law at best must be considered to
be largely an outgrowth of nineteenth century problems, think-
ing, and decisions. A recent case decided by the Ohio Supreme
court, Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp.,1 invites renewed attention
to this subject in Ohio-more particularly, to the problem of the
availability of remedies under defective municipal contracts in
the broader context of public contracts; for the difficulties are
essentially the same at all levels of government. This case
illustrates the necessity for legislative action if the needs of both
municipal corporations and their contractors are to be adequately
served in modern society, since it evidences continued judicial
failure to respond to changed conditions in this field.
I.
Contractors' Relief When Statutory Prescribed Mode of
Contracting Is Not Followed
It has been said2 that quasi-contractual relief was thought
to be unavailable against an Ohio municipal corporation8 by
virtue of the statement of the Ohio Supreme Court in the early
case of City of Wellston v. Morgan:
*Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University School of Law.
1 5 Ohio St. 2d 41, 213 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
2 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.07 at 695-96 (1968).
3 Village of Eastlake v. Davis, 94 Ohio App. 71, 114 N.E.2d 627 (1952);
Village of Beachwood v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 47 Ohio App. 212, 191
N.E. 797 (1934).
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There has been no common law implied municipal liability
in this state since the passage of the act of April 8, 1876,
amending Section 97 of the Municipal Code, 73 0. L. 125,
and carried into the Revised Statutes as section 1693, . . 4
However, this is clearly a misleading interpretation, as the
principle of restitution or unjust enrichment based on the value
of the benefit received has been repeatedly applied to Ohio
public corporations in a variety of circumstances-for example,
when a taxpayer has made payment to the wrong taxing unit,5
and when impossibility has prevented performance of a county
contract.6 It has been suggested as being applicable if a cor-
porate duty was performed by one other than a volunteer.
7
Another possible meaning of the Supreme Court's state-
ment, and the one the Court itself suggested in a later case,s
is that the application of quasi-contract was to be ruled out in
situations where there had been a failure to follow statutory
requirements for contracting. This narrower interpretation was
based, as noted, primarily on the provisions of § 1693, Ohio Re-
vised Statutes, which provided in part:
no contract, agreement, or obligation shall be entered into
except by an ordinance or resolution of the council, ...
and every contract, agreement, or obligation, . . . made con-
trary to the provisions of this section shall be void as against
the corporation, but binding on the person or persons making
it. . .9 (Emphasis added.)
But even this construction of the statute was not a necessary
one, as the requirement that municipal contracts be based on or-
dinance might have meant that the legislature desired only that
a municipality act by express contracts and not by contracts
implied-in-fact. Since implied-in-law, or quasi-contracts, are not
contracts at all but merely a remedy device, 10 such relief may
not have been in the legislative mind when § 1693 was passed.
The court's holding in Morgan, however, is not consistent with
4 65 Ohio St. 219, 228, 62 N.E. 127, 128 (1901).
5 Village of Indian Hill v. Atkins, 153 Ohio St. 562, 93 N.E.2d 22 (1950).
6 State, ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 91 Ohio St. 85, 109 N.E. 636 (1914).
7 Board of Township Trustees v. Village of Ottawa, 4 Ohio Op. 452, 32
N.E.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1935).
8 Village of Indian Hill v. Atkins, 153 Ohio St. 562, 93 N.E.2d 22 (1950).
9 77 Ohio L. 34 (1880).
10 For an explanation of the historical development of the quasi-contract
remedy see, Restatement of Restitution, Introductory Note 4-9 (1937).
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this even more limited interpretation. The court was faced with
a claim for quasi-contractual relief in a situation where there
had been an express contract for the supply of light for 99 years,
which contract had previously"l been refused enforcement, be-
cause of its violation of a ten-year statutory limit. Moreover,
the court cited with approval earlier cases 12 in which various
remedies had been denied the contractor because of a failure to
abide by statutory requirements concerning advertising for bids,
certification of availability of funds, and similar matters. The
court said:
the doctrine (is) established that public officers incur obli-
gations against those for whom they act, only in pursuance
of the provisions of the statutes, and that they cannot deal
with the quantum meruit, or reasonable value plan. With
these holdings we are content.13
And so the court denied the availability of quasi-contract as a
remedy (and not just implied-in-fact contracts) partly by re-
affirmation of precedent on the theory that it would be de-
structive of restrictive statutes to do otherwise, but primarily
on the basis of broadly interpreting § 1693 as a legislative di-
rective against such relief.
This holding put beyond the reach of future courts the
flexibility of relief afforded by the principle of quasi-contract.
It also opened the court of criticism for its failure to take into
consideration the differences in language which might appear in
the various restrictive statutes, as well as the legislative intent
that motivated their passage. If the court did not wish its hold-
ing to be so broadly applied, but intended that it should be
limited to the particular statute before it, or to those enactments
involved in the precedent cited, its statements were definitely
misleading, a fact that is made evident in subsequent cases.
The question of whether relief is obtainable under a de-
fective municipal contract is, of course, not limited to the issue
of unjust enrichment. Rather, there is the threshold question
of whether the defect is of such a nature as to require that the
contract's enforcement by either specific performance or a dam-
11 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 59 Ohio St. 147, 52 N.E. 127 (1898).
12 McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St. 439, 44 N.E. 95
(1896); City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N.E. 52 (1898);
Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell, 60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899);
Comstock v. Village of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N.E. 15 (1899).
13 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Ohio St. 219, 229, 62 N.E. 127, 128-29
(1901).
Fall, 1968
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age award be denied. Another issue is the willingness of a court
to enjoin a municipality from making payments under such a
contract. The applicability of the principles of estoppel and rati-
fication against a municipal corporation and the possibility of
obtaining specific restitution, or return in kind, of property de-
livered to the municipality also need to be considered, as does
the power of the municipal corporation to recover what it has
paid, with or without the duty to restore to the contractor what
it has received. Finally, there is the possibility of applying the
theory of conversion against the municipal corporation.
Adding to the varigated picture created by the different
forms or theories of potential relief is the wide range of require-
ments that statutes may impose. These include, to mention only
the more common ones: prior authorization for a contract, or
subsequent approval; detailed plans and specifications; adver-
tisement for bids; appropriation of money for the intended pur-
pose; and a certificate of the availability of funds to meet the
payments to come due under the contract. With each statutory
requirement there is, of necessity, the further problem of de-
termining the legislative intent behind it, for it is the legislative
purpose which ought to be of crucial importance in the judicial
determination of what, if any relief, should be granted when a
requirement is violated. This is the theory under which the
authors of the Restatement of Restitution view the availability
of quasi-contractual relief.14
As mentioned, the court in Morgan was influenced and aided
by four decisions it had recently made on the general question
of municipal contract remedies. These, with several others de-
cided in the years following the Morgan case, serve as the
formative basis for the law in Ohio on this subject.
The first was McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus.15
This involved a claim by McCloud for his expected profits under
a contract to construct an improvement even though the city
had only defectively complied with statutory provisions. (It
failed to advertise for bids for the length of time required.) 16
14 § 62 (1937).
15 54 Ohio St. 439, 44 N.E. 95 (1896).
16 "When the corporation makes an improvement or repair provided for
in this chapter, the cost of which will exceed five hundred dollars, it shall
proceed as follows:
First. It shall advertise for bids for the period of two weeks, or if the
(Continued on next page)
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The assessment against property owners for the contract price
had previously been set aside, but under statutory authority
McCloud had recovered his actual costs. Further relief was
denied because the court felt that to grant it would amount to
permitting indirect recovery from the general property owners
of the city for a benefit conferred on specific property owners.
In reaching this conclusion the court emphasized the need to
advance the purpose of the statute as a safeguard for taxpayers,
who were less able to look out after their interests than a mu-
nicipal contractor was able to protect his.17
Two years later the court was faced with a case, City of
Lancaster v. Miller,'8 in which there had been a total lack of
compliance with the provisions of three statutes (dealing with
formal advertising, 19 contracting by ordinance,20 and certifica-
tion of availability of funds 21). The suit was for the balance
due on the contract, but the contractor proposed an alternative
by also seeking the value of the labor and materials supplied
on the basis of quantum meruit. The court conceded for argu-
ment that a subsequent appropriation of funds might serve to
ratify the contract 2 2 and thus correct the lack of an ordinance to
(Continued from preceding page)
estimated costs exceed five thousand dollars, four weeks, in two news-
papers published in the corporation, or one newspaper, if only one is
published therein; or by posting advertisements in three public
places in the corporation, if no newspaper is published therein." 86
Ohio L. 341 (1889), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2303.
17 McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St. 439, 453, 44 N.E.
95, 96 (1896).
18 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N.E. 52 (1898).
19 86 Ohio L. 341 (1889), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2303, the statute involved in
the McCloud case and quoted in note 16 supra.
20 77 Ohio L. 34 (1880), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 1693, the statute involved in the
Morgan case, supra note 13 and text accompanying same.
21 "No contract, agreement or other obligation involving the expenditure
of money shall be entered into, nor shall any ordinance, resolution or order
for the appropriation or expenditure of money, be passed by the council or
by any board or officer of a municipal corporation, unless the auditor of
the corporation, and if there is no auditor, the clerk thereof, shall first
certify that the money required for the contract, agreement or other obli-
gation, or to pay the appropriation or expenditure, is in the treasury to
the credit of the fund from which it is to be drawn and not appropriated
for any other purposes .. ; and all contracts, agreements or other obli-
gations, and all ordinances, resolutions and orders entered into or passed,
contrary to the provisions of this section shall be void; ... " (Emphasis
added.) 86 Ohio L. 392 (1889), Ohio Rev. Stats. §2702.
22 "[A]ny contract that an individual, or body corporate or politic, may
lawfully make, they may lawfully ratify and adopt, when made in their
name without authority; and when adopted, it has its effect from the time
it was made, and the same effect as though no agent had intervened."
State v. Buttles, 3 Ohio St. 309, 323 (1854).
Fall, 1968
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enter into it, but it found the contract invalid and denied all
relief because of the failure to meet the requirements of the re-
maining two statutes. The court again stressed the need to
further the statutory motive of protecting the taxpayer and the
propriety of leaving the risk of possible loss upon the contractor. 23
In reaching this result, the court rejected the contractor's claim
of estoppel against the city with these words:
The corporation should not be estopped by the acts of its
officers to set up these statutes in defense to contracts made
in disregard of them. It would be idle to enact these statutes,
and afterwards permit their practical abrogation by neglect
or other misconduct of the officers of the municipality.24
In Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell 25 the court was con-
cerned with a county contract in which the provisions of a num-
ber of code sections 2 were violated (in that no plans or estimates
were drawn, no advertising for proposals was done, and no ap-
proval was obtained from the designated officers). An injunc-
tion against payments under this contract had been previously
granted, and the contractor now sued for the value of his work
plus interest, or in the alternative, for the value of the use of
the bridge, or the return of the bridge. The court, seeking to
prevent the evils which caused the enactment of these statutes,
held that these defects were fatal to the validity of the contract.
It found that the commissioners neither had the power to make
the contract in the way they did nor to bind the county by way
of quasi-contract, and that the contractor had notice of this lack
of power. In language appropriate for a finding of illegality the
court stated:
In this case both parties have acted in disregard of the
statute, and the court will leave them where they have
placed themselves, and refuse to aid either.2 7
23 City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 575, 576, 51 N.E. 52, 55
(1898).
24 City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 575, 51 N.E. 52, 55 (1898).
Estoppel prevents the responsible party from asserting the truth of a state-
ment or existence of a fact. It is based on conduct, intended to induce
reliance, which presents a material fact known to the acting party, but
the truth of which is unknown to the other party who relies on it, so
that, if he is compelled to alter what he has done, he will suffer a loss.
Kilko v. City of Cleveland, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 102 N.E.2d 476 (Ct. App.
1951).
25 60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899).
26 66 Ohio L. 54, 55 § 8, § 10 (1869), as amended; 68 Ohio L. 20 § 7, 103
§ 9 (1871), as amended, Ohio Rev. Stats. §§ 795-99. Only in the last sec-
tion were the terms "null and void" used.
27 Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell, 60 Ohio St. 406, 426, 54 N.E. 372, 376
(1899).
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A failure to abide by statutory certification requirements2 s
for a contract for improvements was again before the court in
Comstock v. Village of Nelsonville.29 Here an injunction was
sought against the levy of a tax or an assessment upon the prop-
erty in the village, the payment of the certificates and notes
issued, and any further depletion of the street fund to pay for
the improvement. The court granted the injunction on the au-
thority of the three above cases after refusing to invoke an
estoppel against the city.
In such cases the contract as well as what is done there-
under, is void as against the municipality.
30
In State, ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer,31 which was decided after
the Morgan case, there was again a failure to meet certification
requirements. 32 However, in this case the prosecutor on behalf
of the county sought under statutory authority33 to recover back
from the agent of the contractor county funds allegedly illegally
spent under the contract. The court acknowledged the invalidity
of the contract and the authority to recover illegally spent funds
but concluded that the statute was not intended to change the
common law rule requiring the county to restore the property
it had obtained before it could recover what it had spent.
3 4 Of
course, before this requirement can apply the county must have
received something of value from the contractor. In this case
28 86 Ohio L. 392 (1889), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2702, the statute involved in
the Miller case and quoted in note 21 supra.
29 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N.E. 15 (1899).
30 Comstock v. Village of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 295, 56 N.E. 15, 17
(1899).
31 77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N.E. 518 (1907).
32 "The commissioners of any county, the trustees of any township and
the board of education of any school district, . . ., shall enter into no
contract, agreement, or obligation involving the expenditure of money, nor
shall any resolution or order for the appropriation or expenditure of
money, be passed by any board of county commissioners, township
trustees or board of education, . . ., unless the auditor or clerk thereof
shall first certify that the money required for the payment of such obli-
gation or appropriation is in the treasury to the credit of the fund from
which it is to be drawn, or has been levied and placed on the duplicate
and in process of collection and not appropriated for any other pur-
pose; . . . and all contracts, agreements or obligations, and all orders or
resolutions, entered into or passed contrary to the provisions of this sec-
tion shall be void. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 93 Ohio L. 218 (1898), Ohio
Rev. Stats. § 28341 (analogous section now Ohio Rev. Code § 5705.41 (1953)).
33 Predecessor of Ohio Rev. Code § 309.12 (1953).
34 State, ex Tel. Hunt v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 16, 82 N.E.518, 521 (1907).
Fall, 1968
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the property (a bridge) was apparently returnable. 35 If it had
not been, it is unclear whether this would have precluded re-
covery, would have caused a waiver of the requirement, or would
have induced the court to make the county pay for the reason-
able value of the property it retained.
In McCormick v. City of Nilel, the contractor sued on an
account for his services in publishing legal notices "at the re-
quest of said city, by its auditor and clerk of council, and ap-
proved by its city solicitor, . . ." 31 The court, on the authority
of Morgan, concluded that since there was no real allegation of
an express contract (as none of the named officials had the power
to contract for the city), there could be no recovery.
In Frisbie Co. v. City of East Cleveland3 s lack of advertising
for bids as required by statute3 9 for a contract between a land
developer and the city proved fatal to recovery from the city
of the amount due on a contract to install water lines:
It is well settled in this state that where the statute pre-
scribes the mode by which the power therein conferred
upon a municipal body shall be exercised, the mode specified
is likewise the measure of the power granted, and that a
contract made otherwise than as expressly prescribed and
limited by statute is not binding or obligatory as a contract.4"
The court also rejected on the authority of earlier cases the idea
that there could be implied liability by acceptance of the im-
provement or estoppel from acts of the officers of the city. The
court further refused to rule that the city's use of the pipe
amounted to conversion, declaring that a mere breach of con-
tract does not give rise to a conversion.
35 The circuit court assumed that it was. State, ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer,
8 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 216 (Cir. Ct. 1906).
30 81 Ohio St. 246, 90 N.E. 803 (1909).
37 McCormick v. City of Niles, 81 Ohio St. 246, 252, 90 N.E. 803, 804 (1909).
38 98 Ohio St. 266, 120 N.E. 309 (1918).
39 "The trustee or board, before entering into any contract for work to be
done, the estimated cost of which exceeds five hundred dollars, shall cause
at least two weeks' notice to be given, in one or more daily newspapers
of general circulation in the corporation, that proposals will be received
by the trustees, for performing of the work specified in such notice; and
the trustees shall contract with the lowest bidder, if in their opinion he
can be depended on to do the work with ability, promptness, and fidelity;
and if such be not the case, the trustees may award the contract to the
next lowest bidder or decline to contract, and advertise again." 66 Ohio
L. 207 § 346 (1869), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2419.
40 Frisbie Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 266, 273-74, 120 N.E.
309, 311 (1918).
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Failure to obtain authorization by council and to advertise
for bids as required by statute4 ' constituted the defects in the
contract involved in Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Village of Woods-
field.4 2 The contractor was to furnish supplies to the village and
to purchase some used meters from it. One was to be credited
against the other. The contractor sued on the contract for the
balance. The court found the contract void and denied relief
under it. It also found estoppel was not applicable against the
city, relying on the authority of the Miller case. However, the
court added that title to the meters supplied by the plaintiff
had not passed to the village and that the law would in a proper
suit compel their restitution (or compensation from the vil-
lage), as the contract did not offend public policy and was not
malum in se. 43 In a second suit44 brought by the contractor on
the theory of conversion the court retreated from its dictum
that compensation was available by stating that only specific
restitution of identified meters could be had. The difficulty of
identifying particular meters for the purpose of obtaining their
return was not permitted to provide an excuse for allowing the
recovery of their value through an action in conversion which,
it was emphasized, was essentially the relief denied in the first
action.
41 "The director of public service may make any contract or purchase
supplies or material or provide labor for any work under the supervision
of that department not involving more than five hundred dollars. When
an expenditure within the department, other than the compensation of
persons employed therein, exceeds five hundred dollars, such expenditure
shall first be authorized and directed by ordinance of council. When so
authorized and directed, the director of public service shall make a written
contract with the lowest and best bidder after advertisement for not less
than two nor more than four consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation within the city." 96 Ohio L. 67 § 143 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code
§ 4328 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 735.05 (Supp. 1967)). "The board of trustees
of public affairs shall have the same powers and perform the same duties
as are possessed by, and are incumbent upon, the director of public services
as provided in sections ... 4328, . . . General Code, . . ." 96 Ohio L.
85, § 205 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code § 4361 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 735.29
(1953)).
42115 Ohio St. 675, 155 N.E. 386 (1927).
43 The court relied on Hill County v. Shaw & Borden Co., 225 Fed. 475
(9th Cir. 1915), for this proposition. There recovery was permitted against
a county on the theory of conversion of property that could not be returned
when the contract was found to be invalid for violating an implied statu-
tory prohibition. In dictum the court also intimated that recovery on
quantum meruit would be available.
44 Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Village of Woodsfield, 122 Ohio St. 148, 171
N.E. 23 (1930).
Fall, 1968
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In summary, these cases uniformly held that defective con-
tracts were completely invalid and that no relief was obtainable
on them. Theories of quasi-contract, estoppel, and conversion
were rejected because they were regarded as amounting to indi-
rect methods of enforcement and therefore as being incompatible
with the purposes of the statutes. All quasi-contractual relief was
ruled out where there was a failure to follow a restrictive statute.
However, the possibility of a limited application of the doctrine
of ratification was left open, and a suggestion was made that
specific restitution of property to the contractor would be avail-
able in an appropriate case. Finally, the court held that the
power of a public body to recover funds expended under an in-
valid contract was conditioned upon the making of an offer to
restore the property it had acquired by means of such a contract.
It may be advanced in support of these generally harsh
and unbending decisions that they were reached in cases in-
volving requirements considered important by a majority of
courts in this country.45 Moreover, several involved statutes
which were drafted in language evidencing a legislative desire
that the requirements be treated as important.40 There was a
total lack of compliance with statutory requirements in several
cases. This factor might properly raise a question as to the
good faith of the contractor and would perhaps justify a refusal
to apply any mitigating principles, even where the legislative
intention was not unequivocally expressed.47 Moreover, mere
substantial compliance or compliance with a similar statutory
requirement arguably should not entitle one to obtain the bene-
fit of the bargain by recovering the contract price.4s However,
all relief was denied even in those cases where strong and
45 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.27 (advertising), § 10.31(specifications), § 10.47 (authorization by ordinance, majority permit quasi-
contractual relief), § 10.50 at 791 (certification of funds), § 10.52 (approval)(1968).
40 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Ohio St. 219, 62 N.E. 127 (1901), 77 Ohio
L. 34 (1880), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 1693, supra p. 2; Comstock v. Village of
Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N.E. 15 (1899), 86 Ohio L. 392 (1889), Ohio
Rev. Stats. § 2702, supra note 21; City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St.
558, 51 N.E. 52 (1898), 77 Ohio L. 34 (1880), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 1693, supra
p. 2, 86 Ohio L. 392 (1889), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2702, supra note 21.
47 McCormick v. City of Niles, 81 Ohio St. 246, 90 N.E. 803 (1909); Bu-
chanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell, 60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899), 66
Ohio L. 54, 55 § 8, § 10 (1869), as amended; 68 Ohio L. 20 § 7, 103 § 9(1871), as amended, Ohio Rev. Stats. §§ 795-99.
48 McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St. 439, 44 N.E. 95
(1895), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2303, 86 Ohio L. 341 (1889), supra note 16.
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definite legislative intent was not evident in the language of
the statutes involved 49 (On the other hand, where strong statu-
tory language was used, the court has lessened the severity of
its approach by denying recovery to a county without restoration
of the benefits it had received. 50 )
In light of this treatment of the problems in this area of the
law by the Ohio Supreme Court, a number of broad conclusions
might be justifiably drawn: The court will not place controlling
significance on the phrasing of the statutory requirement. It is
not likely to discriminate between the more and the less sig-
nificant requirements, nor to be influenced by the degree to
which they have been followed (unless, of course, they have
been completely satisfied). Rather, the court has accepted the
theory that observance of statutory requirements is necessary
for the municipality to acquire the power to contract. The court
has sought to find and effectuate a statutory intent to protect the
taxpayer, apparently accepting the premise that the contractor
is able to protect himself. Arguments based on unjust enrich-
ment have seldom moved the court. In short, the approach taken
by the court has, in general, been one of solicitude for the public
and of relative indifference toward the contractor.
There remains the need to examine the manner in which
the approach charted by the Ohio Supreme Court in these germi-
nal cases has been developed.
A. Implied-in-Fact Contracts
Acting consistently with the Morgan and McCormick ap-
proach,51 courts have denied recovery to persons who have sup-
plied benefits to a municipality without procuring an express
contract to cover the claim for payment,52 and persons whose per-
49 Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Village of Woodsfield, 122 Ohio St. 148, 171
N.E. 23 (1930), Ohio Gen. Code §§ 4328, 4361, as amended (now Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 735.05 (Supp. 1967), .29 (1953)), supra note 41; Ludwig Hommel &
Co. v. Village of Woodsfield, 115 Ohio St. 675, 155 N.E. 386 (1927); Frisbie
Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 266, 120 N.E. 309 (1918), 66
Ohio L. 207 § 346 (1869), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2419, supra note 39.
50 State, ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N.E. 518 (1907), 93
Ohio L. 218 (1898), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 28346 (analogous section now Ohio
Rev. Code § 5705.41 (1953), supra note 32).
51 81 Ohio St. 246, 90 N.E. 803 (1909).
52 John T. McGowan Co. v. City of Portsmouth, 106 Ohio St. 629, 140
N.E. 171 (1922); City of Toledo v. National Supply Co., 16 Ohio L. Abs.
(Continued on next page)
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formance varied from the terms of an express contract.5 3 In view
of the sometimes nice distinctions separating implied-in-fact and
quasi-contract, it is not always clear in these cases which was
the real basis for the decision. However, to the extent that the
latter theory was the rationale, it should properly be limited to
denying relief when statutory requirements have not been met.
B. Failure to Advertise
Advertising for the submission of bids and awarding con-
tracts to the lowest (or lowest and best) bidder have been re-
quired of public authorities by statutes covering a wide expanse
of time . 4 These requirements have generally been imposed for
the purpose of establishing free and open competition for public
contracts, thereby lessening the danger of fraud, favoritism, and
corruption and increasing the opportunity of obtaining the best
performance at the lowest price. 5 It was this type of require-
ment that was involved in the Miller5 6 Buchanan,5 7 Frisbie,5 s
and Hommel5 9 cases, in which the court: established the in-
validity of the contract; refused to permit recovery on it; issued
an injunction against payment; declined to invoke an estoppel;
(Continued from preceding page)
203 (Ct. App. 1934); Union Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 18 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 615 (C.P. 1916). One possible exception is: State, ex rel.
Morgan v. Rusk, 37 Ohio App. 109, 174 N.E. 142 (1930), where elements
of an implied-in-fact contract were present but they were re-enforced
by affirmative municipal action recognizing a moral obligation owed to
the claimant. See note 240 infra.
53 Village of Eastlake v. Davis, 94 Ohio App. 71, 114 N.E.2d 627 (1952);
State, ex rel. Roettinger v. City of Cincinnati, 49 Ohio App. 42, 195 N.E.
71 (1934).
54 As to counties: Swan & Saylor 86 (1868), violating contracts are made
void; 68 Ohio L. 103 (1871), as amended, Ohio Rev. Stats. § 798; 111 Ohio
L. 415 (1925), 85 Ohio L. 218 (1888), as amended, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 153.32,
34 (Supp. 1967); Ohio Rev. Code §§ 307.86-.92 (Supp. 1967). As to cities:
Ohio Rev. Code § 735.05 (Supp. 1967) (formerly Ohio Gen. Code § 4328,
supra note 41). As to school boards: Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.46 (Supp.
1960) (formerly Ohio Gen. Code § 7623), which provides that the board
"must proceed . . ."); 66 Ohio L. 207 § 346 (1869), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2419,
supra note 39.
55 C. Rhyne, Municipal Contracts 35 (1952).
56 City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N.E. 52 (1898).
57 Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell, 60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899).
5s Frisbie Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 266, 120 N.E. 309
(1918).
59 Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Village of Woodsfield, 115 Ohio St. 675, 155
N.E. 386 (1927); Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Village of Woodsfield, 122 Ohio
St. 148, 171 N.E. 23 (1930).
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and denied quasi-contractual relief, specific restitution, and re-
lief based on the theory of conversion.
The course of those decisions has not been noticeably changed
with respect to the invalidity holding, the denial of recovery on
the contract,60 and the granting of an injunction against further
performance 1 or payment.6 2 On the authority of Morgan, quasi-
contractual relief was denied in Landis v. Board of Education,63
as being a "novel theory" destructive of statutory requirements
of fifty years' standing. In that case the court avoided being
misled by the first Hommel case by limiting its meaning (as did
the Supreme Court itself in the second Hommel case) to au-
thorizing only specific restitution. This relief, however, was not
granted in Landis because there was no way to return the labor
furnished. A common pleas court 64 has acted inconsistently by
following both Landis (and denying recovery for labor supplied)
and the first Hommel case (by suggesting that compensation be
paid for supplies used by the school board).
The defense of invalidity was successfully raised in an early
circuit court case6 5 in which a county sought relief under a con-
tract awarded without meeting bidding requirements. The court
suggested that to hold otherwise would amount to compelling
performance from the contractor when payment therefor could
later be refused or be enjoined by a taxpayer's suit.
Instead of a complete failure to abide by advertising re-
quirements, as occurred in the cases just considered, defective
compliance (such as took place in the McCloud6 case) has
been the issue in a number of cases through the years. It is in
addressing itself to such an issue, involving statutory infractions
and potential injury to the contractor of varying degrees of
60 State, ex rel. Baen v. Yeatman, 22 Ohio St. 546 (1872).
61 Phillips v. Hume, 122 Ohio St. 11, 170 N.E. 438 (1950); State, ex rel.
Kuhn v. Smith, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 527, 194 N.E.2d 186 (C.P. 1963).
62 Newton v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 756 (Cir. Ct. 1892), aff'd, 52
Ohio St. 649, 44 N.E. 1133 (1895), against issuance of bonds to pay money
due under a contract awarded without required advertising; State, ex rel.
Files v. Biddle, 3 Ohio N.P. 173 (C.P. 1896), quasi-contract also denied.
63 16 Ohio L. Abs. 190, 191 (Ct. App. 1933).
64 State, ex rel. Kuhn v. Smith, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 527, 194 N.E.2d 186 (C.P.
1963).
65 State, ex rel. Huston v. Esswein, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 225 (Cir. Ct.
1908), aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 552, 91 N.E. 1140 (1910).
66 McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St. 439, 44 N.E. 95
(1896).
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seriousness, that a court would seem to need flexibility of
remedy the most. However, the pattern has been as nearly uni-
form in the denial of relief here as in the cases involving more
extensive deficiencies.
Invalidity has been found: for failure to provide required
plans and specifications for proper advertising (and recovery of
lost profits was denied); 67 for alteration of a bid for a nonap-
parent mistake after award of the contract (and recovery of the
balance due on the contract was denied); 68 for failure to state
bids for material and labor separately for a county contract; 69
for stifling competition by making prior arrangements with a
bidder; 70 and for supplying vague specifications.7 1 The state
has also been denied damages for breach of a contract awarded
after insufficient advertisement for bids.
72
Both quasi-contractual relief and application of the doctrine
of estoppel were denied the contractor in one case, 73 but in an-
other case, involving similar facts, a mandatory injunction to
compel the contractor to repay funds already received under a
fully executed contract was denied.7 4
When dealing with requests for injunctive relief to prevent
payment under contracts awarded by defective advertising, the
courts have been less unyielding than in the cases just con-
sidered. This is no doubt due in part to the equitable considera-
tions present in the individual cases. However, by tailoring the
67 Cordeman v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 499 (1872).
Us McGreevey v. Board of Educ., 20 Ohio C.C.R. 114 (Cir. Ct. 1900).
69 Weibel v. Poda, 116 Ohio App. 38, 186 N.E.2d 504 (1962). Contra, Wiese
& Hanby v. City of Cincinnati, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 481 (C.P. 1913), when
a balance due on the contract was sought.
70 Young v. City of Dayton, 12 Ohio St.2d 71, 232 N.E.2d 655 (1967) in-
volved the violation of charter provisions requiring competition in the
sale of surplus municipal property and making violating contracts void.
71 Eikenbary v. City of Dayton, 3 Ohio App.2d 295, 210 N.E.2d 402 (1964)
involved the violation of an ordinance imposing the requirement of com-
petition in awarding urban renewal contracts.
72 State v. Kuhner & King, 107 Ohio St. 406, 140 N.E. 344 (1923).
73 McGreevey v. Board of Educ., 20 Ohio C.C.R. 114 (Cir. Ct. 1900) supra
note 68.
74 McAlexander v. Haviland Village School Dist., 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 590
(C.P. 1906). In this case the bidder had been permitted prior to the award
of the contract to bring the amount of his bid down below the amount
available to the district. But in another early trial court case, State, ex rel.
Huston v. Huston & Cleveland, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 423 (C.P. 1906), it was
held that an allegation that there had been a failure to file plans as a
preliminary to advertising was not irrelevant to an action to recover back
money claimed to have been illegally spent under a county contract.
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use of this remedy to the seriousness of the defect in issue the
courts have nevertheless achieved a degree of flexibility.75 An
injunction even against further performance has been denied
in one instance,76 although granted in others. 7
C. Lack of Prior Appropriation or Certification of Funds
Statutory provisions both for municipal corporations 7s and
other public subdivisions79 have for a long time required that
before public contracts be awarded, funds be appropriated for
payments to become due under them, and when tax money is
involved, a statement be issued certifying that sufficient funds
are either in the treasury or in the process of collection. These
provisions were early construed as legislative efforts to guard
against "extravagant and improvident" so spending and to pre-
vent "floating indebtedness." 81 Acting consistently with the
strong statutory language prohibiting relief under defective con-
75 An injunction was denied on the basis of laches even though alternative
specifications had been advertised thereby giving public officials discretion
to select upon what basis the contract would be awarded. Emmert v. City
of Elyria, 6 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 381 (Cir. Ct. 1905), aff'd on other grounds,
74 Ohio St. 185, 78 N.E. 269 (1906). Where no laches were found and the
statute made the contract void, an injunction was granted. Herstenstern
v. Herrman, 6 Ohio N.P. 93 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1898). Possible avoid-
ance of specification limitations by acceptance of non-conforming goods
was not sufficient to justify an injunction against payment after full per-
formance. State, ex rel. Wolfe v. Atcherson, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 608 (Ct. App.
1932).
76 The reason was a failure to show that legal remedies were inadequate.
In this case, involving a state contract, cost estimates had been changed
during the time they were required to be on file for public examination.
State, ex rel. Ohio National Lime & Stone Co. v. Merrell, 19 Ohio L. Abs.
547 (Ct. App. 1935).
7 The defect was a failure to advertise for the prescribed time for ajoint state-county contract in State, ex rel. Boyd v. McMasters, 10 Ohio
App. 361 (1918); and specifications were so restrictive as to stifle competi-
tion in Fisher Auto & Service Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 16 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 369 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1914).
78 79 Ohio L. 54, 55 (1882), with amendments, Ohio Rev. Stats. §2702,
supra note 21; 96 Ohio L. 37 § 45 (1902), Ohio Mun. Code § 45; 96 Ohio
L. 37 §45 (1902), Bates Ohio Rev. Stats. §1536-205; 101 Ohio L. 262
(1910), Ohio Gen. Code § 3806; Ohio Rev. Code § 5705.41 (1953).
79 92 Ohio L. 341 (1896), with amendments, Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2834b, supra
note 32; Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2834b, with amendments, Ohio Gen. Code§§ 5660, 61; 112 Ohio L. 406 § 33 (1927), with amendments, Ohio Gen. Code
§ 5623-33; Ohio Rev. Code § 5705.41 (1953).
80 L. H. Bond v. Village of Madisonville, 2 Ohio C.C.R. 449, 452 (Cir. Ct.
1887).
81 Mad River Township v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co., 5 Ohio
App. 298, 305 (1916).
Fall, 1968
15
Vaubel: Relief Under Defective Municipal Contract
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1969
RELIEF UNDER DEFECTIVE MUNICIPAL CONTRACT
tracts,82 the courts have construed these statutes to be the
"measure" s3 of the municipal power to contract.
These requirements were involved in the Miller,8 4 Corn-
stock8 5 and Fronizer-8 cases, in which the Supreme Court re-
fused relief on the contract, granted an injunction against pay-
ment, and rejected both estoppel and quasi-contractual relief, but
conditioned the county's right to recover back payments made
upon restoration of the benefit obtained. Only slight variations
from this pattern of decisions are discernible in the many8 7
elaborating rulings concerning these certification and appropria-
tion requirements.
In several cases emphasis has been placed on the failure to
meet the appropriation requirement. Here recovery on the con-
tract has been denied, 8 and injunctions against performances9
and payment" have been granted.
When there has been a failure to obtain a required certifica-
tion of funds courts have held the contract invalid and denied
recovery on it by the contractor,9 or on a surety bond by the
S2 The original statutes, §§ 2702 and 2834b, Ohio Rev. Stats., provided that
"all . . . contracts . . . entered into . . . contrary to the provisions of this
section shall be void . . ." and later statutes, including the current version,
§ 5705.41, Ohio Rev. Code, added "and no warrant shall be issued in pay-
ment of any amount due thereon."
83 Emmert v. City of Elyria, 74 Ohio St. 185, 194, 78 N.E. 269, 271 (1906).
84 City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St. 558, 51 N.E. 52 (1898).
s5 Comstock v. Village of Nelsonville, 61 Ohio St. 288, 56 N.E. 15 (1899).
86 State, ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N.E. 518 (1907).
87 There is a great amount of litigation over these requirements in other
states as well, e.g., Illinois. Ancel, Municipal Contracts, 1961 U.Ill. L.F. 357.
88 State, ex. rel. McGraw v. Smith, 129 Ohio St. 246, 194 N.E. 872 (1935);
Pittinger v. City of Wellsville, 75 Ohio St. 508, 80 N.E. 182 (1907); In-
dustrial Rescue Mission v. City of Columbus, 83 Ohio App. 188, 81 N.E.2d
254 (1948).
89 City of Cincinnati v. Board of City Affairs, 10 Ohio Dec. 104 (Super.
Ct. of Cincinnati 1900).
90 State, ex rel. Ampt v. Lewis, 6 Ohio N.P. 198 (Super. Ct. of Cincin-
nati 1899).
91 City of Findlay v. Pendleton & Whitely, 62 Ohio St. 80, 56 N.E. 649
(1900); Schumacher Stone Co. v. Village of Columbus Grove, 73 Ohio
App. 557, 57 N.E.2d 251 (1944); Lowry v. City of Ironton, 10 Ohio L. Abs.
222 (Ct. App. 1931); State, ex rel. West v. Hudson, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 474 (Ct.
App. 1930); Lima Hospital Soc'y v. City of Lima, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 562 (Ct.
App. 1926); Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Educ., 13 Ohio App. 30
(1919); Mad River Township v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co., 5
Ohio App. 298 (1916).
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subcontractor 2 or the public body,9 3 even when there were
funds actually on hand in the treasury sufficient to cover the
amount of the contract.94 The benefit to be derived from setting
aside funds was emphasized in the latter cases. Where a cer-
tificate has been issued, but the available fund not fully allotted,
the amount of the fund rather than the amount of the certificate
would appear to limit the extent of the contractor's recovery.9 5
As was true with respect to defective advertising, requests
for an injunction against payment to the contractor have proved
troublesome. An injunction was granted in the Comstock case,
and in several cases since,90 but dictum opposing the granting
of such relief appears in a later Supreme Court case, 97 and an
injunction has been refused in trial court cases of about this
period.9 s Thus the courts have retained a degree of flexibility
in their approach to granting this remedy.
Estoppel, too, has been denied the contractor suing on the
contract9 9 and materialmen seeking recovery against a surety
92 Continental Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati Ry. Supply Co., 9 Ohio L. Abs.
471 (Ct. App. 1930).
93 State, ex rel. Huston v. Esswein, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 225 (Cir. Ct.
1908), aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 552, 91 N.E. 1140 (1910), county contract. As to
the availability of relief by a materialman on such a bond, two appeals
courts have come to opposite conclusions: for relief, Metropolitan Paving
Brick Co. v. Federal Surety Co., 50 Ohio App. 143, 197 N.E. 603 (1935), and
against (involving a school board contract) Southern Surety Co. v. Moores-
Coney Co., 29 Ohio App. 310, 163 N.E. 575 (1928).
94 City of Findlay v. Pendleton & Whitely, 62 Ohio St. 80, 56 N.E. 649
(1900); State, ex rel. West v. Hudson, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 474 (Ct. App. 1930);
Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Educ., 13 Ohio App. 30 (1919).
95 City of Cleveland v. Walsh Constr. Co., 279 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1922),
involving a unit price contract. This result is now codified in Ohio Rev.
Code § 5705.41 (1953). Where the fund was exhausted by subsequently-
awarded contracts relief was granted in City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33
Ohio St. 336 (1878), but in another case it was denied because the fund was
fully allotted and if relief were granted, both the certificate and the fund
would have been exceeded. Village of Carthage v. Diekmeier, 79 Ohio St.
323, 87 N.E. 178 (1909). Accord, Board of Comm'rs vs. A. Bentley & Sons
Co., 103 Ohio St. 443, 134 N.E. 441 (1921).
96 But these cases also involved other defects, e.g.: Hawley v. City of
Toledo, 47 Ohio App. 246, 191 N.E. 827 (1934); Smith v. Village of Rock-
ford, 9 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 465 (Cir. Ct. 1906); Matheny v. White, 3 Ohio
Op. 357 (C.P. 1935).
97 Emmert v. City of Elyria, 74 Ohio St. 185, 194-95, 78 N.E. 269, 271
(1906).
98 City of Columbus v. Bohl, 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 469 (C.P. 1903); Ampt
v. City of Cincinnati, 34 Weekly Law Bull. 111 (C.P. 1895), aff'd, 57 Ohio
St. 669, 50 N.E. 1126 (1897); and in dictum in the following cases: Caldwell
v. Marvin, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 387 (C.P. 1909); Fergus v. City of Columbus,
6 Ohio N.P. 82 (C.P. 1898).
99 Schumacher Stone Co. v. Village of Columbus Grove, 73 Ohio App. 557,
57 N.E.2d 251 (1944); Mad River Township v. Austin-Western Road Ma-
chinery Co., 5 Ohio App. 298 (1916).
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when the prime contract was void for lack of a certificate.1"'
However, a special problem involving estoppel arises when a
certificate is issued which proves to be false. Several cases' 01
justify the conclusion, subsequently confirmed by statute,10 2
that if there has been reasonable reliance through part per-
formance, an injunction against payment will be denied.
The decision in the Morgan case and the holding in Miller
have seemingly discouraged claimants from seeking relief on the
basis of quantum meruit. Few cases even raise the issue. Where
it has been raised it has been refused, 1 3 although continued
suggestions are made that specific restitution of the item ob-
tained is available.
10 4
Finally, the conclusion in Fronizer that the statutory right
of a county to recover back benefits paid the contractor is con-
ditioned upon return by the county of the benefits it has received
was accepted by two trial court cases of the same period.10 5
D. Miscellaneous Deficiencies
Ohio statutes, like those of most states, impose numerous
miscellaneous requirements for various public bodies to meet in
awarding their contracts. The failure to meet these require-
100 Southern Surety Co. v. Moores-Coney Co., 29 Ohio App. 310, 163 N.E.
525 (1928).
101 Emmert v. City of Elyria, 6 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 381 (1905), (affd on
other grounds, 74 Ohio 185, 78 N.E. 269 (1906); Broken Sword Stone Co.
v. Monroe Township Trustees, 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 573 (C.P. 1906), aJ'd, 78
Ohio St. 444, 85 N.E. 1120 (1908), dictum; irregularly issued, City of Cleve-
land v. Walsh Const. Co., 279 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1922). An injunction
against payment was granted in Smith v. Village of Rockford, 9 Ohio
C.C.R. (n.s.) 465 (Cir. Ct. 1906), but there was no reasonable reliance.
102 "Any certificate of fiscal officer attached to a contract shall be binding
upon the political subdivisions as to the facts set forth therein." Ohio
Rev. Code §5705.41 (1953).
103 Landis v. Board of Educ., 16 Ohio L. Abs. 190 (Ct. App. 1933); North
v. Commissioners of Huron County, 10 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 462 (Cir. Ct.
1907); 1938 Ops. Att'y Gen. 2053 at 510. A trial court, probably because
of a misconception of precedent, indicated quantum meruit was available in
State, ex rel. Kuhn v. Smith, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 527 (C.P. 1963). Then in
another early, liberal, and evidently out-of-step decision, City of Cleve-
land v. Denison, 16 Ohio C.C.R. 541 (Cir. Ct. 1898), such relief was granted.
104 Landis v. Board of Educ., 16 Ohio L. Abs. 190 (Ct. App. 1933); North
v. Commissioners of Huron County, 10 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 462 (Cir. Ct.
1907).
105 State, ex rel. Homer v. King Bridge Co., 5 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 30 (C.P.
1906); McAlexander v. Haviland Village School Dist., 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
590 (C.P. 1906).
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ments is often used as a defense to a suit brought on the contract.
Frequently, a finding of invalidity and a denial of relief are the
result reached, although occasionally the court considers the par-
ticular requirement to be minor, or "directory." Unfortunately,
when the latter conclusion is reached it is often supported only
by an assertion that the requirement breached is not vital to
the protection of the taxpayer, rather than by a discussion of
the importance of the requirement, which might serve as a guide
to future litigants. An examination of the course of these de-
cisions may help to clarify what one decision leaves unclear.
Failure to record official acts10 6 (at times with the aid of
estoppel-both in favor of 10 7 and against the public body l0 s )
has frequently been treated as a violation of a merely directory
provision. Estoppel has also been of aid in preventing a denial
of relief in a case involving the failure to state labor and ma-
terial bids separately.10 9 The timing of the issuance of a cer-
tification of funds so that it would precede the authorization of
the contract, 110 and the filing of the certification with the
proper official111 have been treated as directory, as have a
number of other minor defects. 112
On the other hand, failure to obtain the prior approval
of some public body or officer for the awarding of a contract has
106 Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393, 57 N.E.2d 164 (1943),
99 Ohio L. 565 § 154a (1908), Ohio Gen. Code § 4402 (now Ohio Rev. Code
§ 733.21 (1953)); Lloyd, ex rel. City of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 20 Ohio
C.C.R. (n.s.) 47 (Cir. Ct. 1912).
107 Commissioners of Athens County v. Baltimore Short Line R.R., 37
Ohio St. 205 (1881).
108 Welder v. Commissioners of Hamilton County, 41 Ohio St. 601 (1885).
109 Wiese & Hanby v. City of Cincinnati, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 481 (C.P.
1913), 96 Ohio L. 67 § 143 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code § 4329 (now Ohio Rev.
Code § 735.06 (1953)).
110 State, ex rel. Hayden v. Donahey, 21 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 249 (C.P. 1918),
Ohio Gen. Code § 5660.
111 State v. Kuhner & King, 107 Ohio St. 406, 140 N.E. 344 (1923), Ohio
Gen. Code § 5660.
112 State, ex rel. Skinner Engine Co. v. Connar, 124 Ohio St. 404, 179 N.E.
132 (1931), awarding state contract during a 30-day bid investigatory
period, 107 Ohio L. 453 (1917), Ohio Gen. Code §2319 (now Ohio Rev.
Code § 153.08 (1953)); Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393,
57 N.E.2d 164 (1943), preparation of contract by city solicitor, 96 Ohio
L. 65 §137 (1902), as amended, Ohio Gen. Code §4305 (now Ohio Rev.
Code § 733.51 (1953)), Trees v. Loomis, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 565, 145 N.E.2d 339
(C.P. 1957), approval of subordinate board to sale of utility by council,
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 721.03, .15 (Supp. 1967); Stolz v. Selz, 12 Ohio Dec. 665
(C.P. 1900), use of parliamentary procedure at meetings of the board of
county commissioners, 70 Ohio L. 35 § 1 (1873), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 849 (now
Ohio Rev. Code § 305.09 (1953)).
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resulted in a denial of quantum meruit relief' 13 and in the pre-
vention of a county from enforcing a surety bond. 114 Failure to
list persons interested in the bidders' success has resulted in a
finding of invalidity 1 5 and in the granting of an injunction
against performance.1 16 Cases involving other requirements in
which similar results were reached are set forth in the notes.' 17
A statutory requirement that private contracts or modifica-
tions be evidenced by a writing does not prevent quasi-
contractual relief generally," 8 or in Ohio." 9 If established by
contract the requirement can be waived, 120 but if a municipal
contract and a statutory demand of a writing are involved, it
has been held that no relief is available.'
2 1
113 State, ex rel. Files v. Biddle, 3 Ohio N.P. 173 (C.P. 1896).
114 State, ex rel. Huston v. Esswein, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 225 (Cir. Ct.
1908), aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 552, 91 N.E. 1140 (1910), 66 Ohio L. 55 § 10 (1869),
as amended, Ohio Rev. Stats. § 799 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 153.44 (1953)).
Faced with the dilemma as to which set of taxpayers to protect, a court
applied estoppel against a city, on receipt of benefits, and in favor of a
county in a water supply contract which lacked the approval of council
as required by 66 Ohio L. 207 § 348 (1869), as amended, 69 Ohio L. 25
§ 352 (1872), as amended, Ohio Gen. Code §§ 3967, 3973 (now Ohio Rev.
Code §§ 743.13, .18 (1953)). Mahoning County Comm'rs v. City of Youngs-
town, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 186, 75 N.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1946).
115 Strack v. Ratterman, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 36 (Cir. Ct. 1899), 70 Ohio L.
83 § 562 (1873), as amended, Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2303. The decision was in
part based on the failure to meet another mandatory provision in 84 Ohio
L. 234 § 2 (1887), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 2702-2 that prohibited the award of a
contract to one who was in default on a prior municipal contract.
116 Powers v. City of Cincinnati, 45 Ohio App. 445, 187 N.E. 305 (1933),
96 Ohio L. 67 § 143 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code § 4329 (now Ohio Rev. Code
§ 735.06 (1953)).
117 Cordeman v. City of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 499 (1872), denial of
profits where improvement board recommendation of improvement, as re-
quired by the act of April 5, 1866, Swan & Sayler 857 (1868), was lacking;
State, ex rel. Grills v. Board of Comm'rs, 42 Ohio App. 49, 181 N.E. 912
(1931), injunction against payment for failure to have voters approval;
Columbiana County Comm'rs v. Rinehart, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 581 (Ct. App.
1923), damages denied to a county because the contractor had failed to
supply a statutory bond; Bowers v. Viereck, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 467, 117 N.E.2d
717 (C.P. 1953), recovery denied on a township contract under provisions
to 70 Ohio L. 246 § 3 (1873), as amended, Ohio Gen. Code § 5910 (now Ohio
Rev. Code § 971.04 (1953)) because of defective notice to property owner
of the erection of a partition fence.
118 Restatement of Contracts § 355 (1932).
119 Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938); Towsley
v. Moore, 30 Ohio St. 184 (1876).
120 Benedict v. City of Cincinnati, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 261 (Super. Ct. of
Cincinnati 1877).
121 Verrill v. City of Newark, 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 303 (C.P. 1910), in which
recovery on the contract, in quantum meruit or on the basis of conversion
(Continued on next page)
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Despite the fact that some pattern is discernible in these
decisions, a contractor with a public body would still be well
advised to demand the most careful compliance with each statu-
tory requirement, for without direct and favorable precedent
the contractor cannot safely assume that an omission will be over-
looked.
E. Contracts for Extras
A contract for modification of a municipal contract may fail
because of an absence of consideration.12 2 It may fail because it
is not truly for "extras" but is instead an entirely different con-
tract and one or more of the usual statutory requirements for
municipal contracts have not been met.J23 Finally, it may fail,
even though for extras, because special statutory requirements
for modifications have not been met. In the latter situation estop-
pel against a city has been refused and an injunction against pay-
ment granted. 124 On the other hand, in a contract for extras an
injunction against payment has been refused 125 when the usual
advertising requirements were found to be impractical and re-
newed authorization by council was deemed unnecessary. How-
ever, the limit of the original appropriation was enforced through
the issuance of an injunction against excessive expenditures.
The statutory requirement that orders for extras be in writ-
ing 26 has suffered from both judicial attention and inattention.
(Continued from preceding page)
was rejected because of a violation of provisions to 96 Ohio L. 67 § 143
(1902), Bates Ohio Rev. Stats. § 1536-679 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 735.05
(Supp. 1967) ).
122 State, ex rel. Uible v. Harlan, 37 Ohio App. 222, 174 N.E. 366 (1930)
(dictum). However, the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-209 (Ohio Rev.
Code § 1302.12 (Supp. 1962)) permits, within its purview, modification of
contracts without consideration.
123 Lloyd, ex rel. City of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 20 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.)
47 (Cir. Ct. 1912), granting an injunction against payment for failure to
advertise for added purchase of an air compressor when the original con-
tract was for construction of a bridge; Mueller v. Board of Educ., 11 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 113 (C.P. 1911), failure to advertise prevented recovery on
the contract; Gano v. Eshelby, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 442 (Super. Ct. of
Cincinnati 1889), granting an injunction against payment for failure to
advertise. Estoppel was also rejected.
124 Gano v. Eshelby, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 442 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati
1889), failure to stay within the amount of the original contract.
125 Lloyd, ex rel. City of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 20 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.)
47 (Cir. Ct. 1912).
126 Current provisions are contained in Ohio Rev. Code §735.07 (1953):
"When, in the opinion of the director of public service, it becomes neces-
(Continued on next page)
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Quite recently it has been nearly negated by a decision which
by its liberal implications will probably give rise to hopes, pos-
sibly false, of judicial distaste for statutory formalities.
In a very early case 2 7 the Supreme Court permitted a
writing requirement to be waived by municipal authorities, and
just a few years ago an appeals court apparently ignored such
a limitation. 12 8 An intervening 1922 Supreme Court decision 29
provided the basis in part for the most recent holding on the
subject. In the 1922 case the writing requirement had been met,
and the certification of funds requirement was found inapplicable
to the type of contract involved. The Supreme Court found that
the order was not for extras at all; hence no further agreement
on price was necessary, since the price of any additions had been
specified in the properly-awarded original contract.
The same court, in deciding Lathrop Co. v. City of Toledo'5 0
in 1966, relied on the Portsmouth holding when confronted by a
similar prior agreement on price. But it went a step further, by
concluding that fulfilling the unmet requirements of a writing
and certification was also unnecessary. Therefore, recovery on
the original contract (or even in quasi-contract) was justified,
since no applicable requirement had been violated.
Offering an additional ground, the court declared that the
city's agreement (in the original contract) to be liable for extras
and the contractor's agreement to perform on order (with a
reservation of a later determination of rights) implied a promise
(Continued from preceding page)
sary, in the prosecution of any work or improvement under contract, to
make alterations or modifications in the contract, such alterations or
modifications shall only be made upon the order of the director, but such
order shall be of no effect until the price to be paid for the work and
material or both, under the altered or modified contract, has been agreed
upon in writing and signed by the director on behalf of the city and
the contractor, and approved by the board of control. No contractor may
recover anything for work or material because of any such alteration or
modification unless the contract is made in such manner, nor shall he be
allowed to recover for such work and material, or either, more than the
agreed price. The law relating to the requiring of bids and the awarding
of contracts for public buildings, and improvements, so far as it applies,
shall remain in full force and effect." Similar provisions applicable to
villages are contained in Ohio Rev. Code § 731.16 (Supp. 1967).
127 City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336 (1878).
12s D. M. Sylvester & Di Paolo Constr. Co. v. Village of North Randall,
8 Ohio App.2d 212, 194 N.E.2d 593 (1963).
129 City of Portsmouth v. Nicola Building Co., 106 Ohio St. 550, 140 N.E.
174 (1922).
130 5 Ohio St.2d 165, 214 N.E.2d 408 (1966).
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on the part of the city to make certain that preconditions to
liability-including a writing and certification-were met.
The net result of this case is the enforcement of an order for
extras that did not meet charter requirements. This was ac-
complished by an extension of precedent and the application of
a somewhat unusual theory of implied promise. The latter ap-
proach seems only partially justified by the terms of the con-
tract in view of other provisions (emphasized by the dissent)
in which the city disclaimed liability until these requirements
were met. But even if justified by the contract, the court would
still be permitting the city to abrogate charter requirements by
first promising their fulfillment and then failing to keep its
promise. However, this case has only limited application as a
method of avoiding contract restrictions, since there cannot be
an enforceable promise to fulfill such requirements unless there
first exists an enforceable contract. Moreover, the case probably
does not evidence a general desire on the part of the court to
be more liberal about granting relief in this field, in view of its
reference to restrictive precedent and the decision reached by it
in the same term in the Pincelli'3 1 case, to be considered later.
However, the underlying similarity between the implied promise
approach and the doctrine of estoppel is worthy of note.
II.
Other Limitations on Municipal Power to Contract
It is not only by mandatory statutory procedures that the
municipal power to contract is circumscribed. Other forms of
limitations also operate in Ohio, such as the following restric-
tions: A contract must be within the general power of the city; it
must not violate constitutional or statutory prohibitions or pub-
lic policy considerations; and it must be entered into by a
properly authorized agent. These are not mutually exclusive
concepts and some, in fact, tend to overlap the statutory pro-
cedure field already considered. One can better understand
limitations on the municipal power to contract and gain a better
perspective of the law on statutory procedures by examining a
brief r6sum6 of the Ohio case law dealing with these limitations.
131 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 5 Ohio St. 2d 41, 213 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
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A. Ultra Vires Contracts
Since the adoption of the Home Rule Amendments to the
Ohio Constitution in 1912132 municipal corporations have had
the power to contract to carry out their functions. Since this
power is granted by the constitution, statutory grants are, in
general, unnecessary. 133 This reversal of the previous situation
does not apply to other political subdivisions of the state. Still,
it serves to reduce materially the area of ultra vires contracts-
those beyond the power of a public body to enter. This area can
be considered to include contracts violating implied limitations
on the power to contract derived from statutory provisions. 134
However, those agreements violating express statutory prohibi-
tions should be distinguished and will be considered later.
A municipality is subject to statutory provisions imposing
limitations on municipal indebtedness and restrictions on ac-
counting procedures pursuant to constitutional grants over these
matters to the state.1 35 It has been held that statutory restric-
tions on the manner of contracting, already considered, come
within this state power, since contracting has been held to create
a debt.136 Where a statutory restriction is considered to be a
measure of municipal power the language of ultra vires is often
used.
This method of classification, although of some value gen-
erally, is of little significance in Ohio, since the type of relief
available to a contractor is nearly the same whether his con-
tract is found to be in violation of statutory requirements for
132 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, §3, general grant; Ohio Const. art. XVIII, 4,
public utilities grant.
133 Hines v. City of Bellefontaine, 74 Ohio App. 393, 57 N.E.2d 164 (1943);
City of Cleveland v. Village of Cuyahoga Heights, 81 Ohio App. 191, 75
N.E.2d 99 (1947); City of Cleveland v. Coughlin, 16 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 468(C.P. 1914).
134 E.g., Vindicator Printing Co. v. State, 68 Ohio St. 362, 67 N.E. 733(1903), no power to contract to print notices more often than stated in
statute.
135 Ohio Const. art. XIII, § 6; Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 13.
136 Phillips v. Hume, 122 Ohio St. 11, 170 N.E. 438 (1930). The underlying
rationale of this case has been criticized and doubted in light of more
recent cases involving the nature of debt, e.g., State, ex rel. Gordon v.
Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d 206 (1952), and the failure of an
appeals court to follow it. City of Youngstown v. Park & Recreation
Comm'n, 68 Ohio App. 104, 39 N.E.2d 214 (1939). 3 Farrell-Ellis, Ohio Mu-
nicipal Code, § 1.39 (11th ed. 1962).
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contracting, ultra vires or, as will be seen, in violation of ex-
press statutory prohibitions.
Efforts to enforce an ultra vires contract in pre-Amendment
days have been rejected. 37 The doctrine of estoppel has gen-
erally been found not to be usable by a contractor against a
municipality.'13  However, its use against the contractor has at
times been suggested,'139 despite the difficulty of explaining how
a contractor might mislead a municipality concerning its own
power 140 and of justifying the fact that such an approach makes
estoppel a one-way street in favor of a city. Such a use of the
doctrine does enable a municipality to get what it bargained
and paid for, but it clearly amounts to the enforcement of an
ultra vires contract, something courts, in general, have been re-
luctant to permit.
Recovery by both a city 14 1 and a county 42 of payments made
to a contractor under an ultra vires contract has also been per-
mitted after provision of statutory authority.
143
B. Unconstitutional Grants of Power
As with respect to ultra vires contracts, the likelihood of
contracting under an unconstitutional grant of power to a mu-
nicipality was much greater in pre-Amendment days than it is
137 Kerlin Bros. v. City of Toledo, 19 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 120 (Cir. Ct.
1909).
138 Louisville & N.R.R. v. City of Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N.E. 983
(1907); Cleveland & P.R.R. v. City of Cleveland, 15 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.)
193 (Cir. Ct. 1910), aff'd, 87 Ohio St. 469, 102 N.E. 1122 (1912), appeal
dismissed, 235 U. S. 50 (1914). In two earlier cases, Pugh v. Cincinnati
Edison Elec. Light Co., 19 Ohio C.C.R. 594 (Cir. Ct. 1900), and Darby v.
City of Norwood, 17 Ohio Dec. 253 (C.P. 1906), injunctive relief was
denied taxpayers because of a lack of equity in favor of the cities due
in part to estoppel considerations.
139 City of Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 103 Ohio St. 79, 133 N.E.
800 (1921); City of Columbus v. Federal Gas & Fuel Co., 10 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 305 (C.P. 1910), aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 547, 106 N.E. 1056 (1913).
140 Ohio, ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 170 F. Supp. 722
(S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 263 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S.
552 (1959).
141 City of Cleveland v. Legal News Publishing Co., 110 Ohio St. 360, 144
N.E. 256 (1924).
142 Vindicator Printing Co. v. State, 68 Ohio St. 362, 67 N.E. 733 (1903).
14 3 101 Ohio L. 382 § 286 (1910), as amended, Ohio Gen. Code § 286 (now
Ohio Rev. Code §117.10 (1953)); 93 Ohio L. 408, amending Ohio Rev.
Stats. § 1277 (1896) (now Ohio Rev. Code § 309.12 (1953)), respectively.
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now. Moreover, the problems it creates and the solutions it in-
vites would at first appear to be little different from those pre-
sented by an ultra vires contract. In fact, this seems to be true
in a number of cases where recovery on the contract, 4 4 or an
injunction against enforcement 45 or against the collection of the
resulting tax levies to pay for bonds already issued," 6 was
sought. However, a contractor labors under a double burden
if he is held to know of the defect of municipal power existing
here. It is not the simple case of finding authority, but the
more difficult one of avoiding being misled by the false appear-
ance of authority. Some courts have been reluctant to impose
such a burden. Consequently, where there has been reliance
through a shift of position, estoppel has been applied to protect
the contractor, particularly where a court in a prior decision has
upheld the constitutionality of the authority. 147 Even where
there was no prior decision, courts have occasionally applied
estoppel in favor of the contractor,14 as well as in favor of the
corporation.149 This result has not been uniformly reached, as
an earlier cited case would indicate.1 50 But the refusal to grant
relief by means of estoppel in some cases may be explained on
the basis that reliance was not justified, 151 or that additional de-
fects were present.152
'44 City of Findlay v. Pendleton & Whitely, 62 Ohio St. 80, 56 N.E. 649(1900).
145 Horstman, ex rel. City of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 12 Ohio Dec.
762 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1902).
146 Hubbard v. Fitzsimmons, 57 Ohio St. 436, 49 N.E. 477 (1898).
147 Thomas v. State, ex rel. Gilbert, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N.E. 437 (1907),
denying an injunction against payment. Suggested in the following de-
cisions: City of Findlay v. Pendleton & Whitely, 62 Ohio St. 80, 56 N.E.649 (1900); Lewis v. Symmes, 61 Ohio St. 471, 56 N.E. 194 (1899); Hubbard
v. Fitzsimmons, 57 Ohio St. 436, 49 N.E. 477 (1898); State, ex rel. Losh v.Gibson, 8 Ohio N.P. 367 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1900), granting an in-junction against levying a tax to pay county bonds.
148 City of Mt. Vernon v. State, ex rel. Berry, 71 Ohio St. 428, 73 N.E. 515
(1905).
149 New York Cent. R.R. v. City of Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E.
450 (1933).
150 Hubbard v. Fitzsimmons, 57 Ohio St. 436, 49 N.E. 477 (1898).
151 Horstman, ex rel. City of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 12 Ohio Dec.
762 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 72 Ohio St.
93, 73 N.E. 1075 (1905).
152 City of Findlay v. Pendleton & Whitely, 62 Ohio St. 80, 56 N.E. 649
(1900), no certification of funds.
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The restoration of benefits by a county as a precondition to
its recovery of payments made to a contractor has been suggested
as being required in this area.
153
C. Constitutional or Statutory Prohibitions
As previously noted, express constitutional or statutory pro-
hibitions against contracts are closely related to implied denials
of power which result in the contracts being held ultra vires,
and the former are overlapped by statutes which prescribe the
mode of contracting and make offending contracts void. Yet, here
the restriction is likely to be more direct and apparent.
There are of course strong reasons for denying relief under
a contract when it is made in direct violation of an express pro-
hibition. In fact, those who would liberalize relief by way of
quasi-contract for those contractors who have entered into de-
fective municipal contracts are far less emphatic in their sug-
gestions when considering this limitation.154 However, in view
of the strict approach in Ohio with respect to the other two types
of limitations, there is no basis for expecting any marked differ-
ence in results here.
A contract which violated constitutional provisions 55 against
municipal aid to privately owned firms has been held invalid and
an injunction seeking its enforcement has been denied. 56 How-
ever, municipal efforts to recover back property given in the
form of aid have been both successful' 57 and unsuccessful.
158
In the latter case the court reasoned that since the initial pur-
chase of property by the city was for an illegal purpose the city
never gained title to it and, therefore, had no right to recover
it from the private firm to which it had conveyed it. The ultimate
result of this approach is to negate, rather than to enforce, this
constitutional prohibition.
Contracts which contravene statutory prohibitions have also
153 State, ex rel. Hunt v. Morganthaler, 20 Ohio Dec. 76 (C.P. 1909), aff'd,
82 Ohio St. 455, 92 N.E. 1124 (1910).
154 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.13 at 715 (1968).
155 Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 6.
156 Bellaire Goblet Co. v. City of Findlay, 5 Ohio C.C.R. 418 (Cir. Ct.
1891).
157 Village of Kent v. Dithridge & Smith Cut Glass Co., 10 Ohio C.C.R.
629 (Cir. Ct. 1895).
15s Markley v. Village of Mineral City, 58 Ohio St. 430, 51 N.E. 28 (1898).
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been found invalid and recovery on them has been denied. 15 9
Injunctions against providing funds for payments under an in-
valid contract have been granted and estoppel against the
city has been denied.10 Recovery back of payments made under
such a contract has been permitted despite losses incurred by
the contractor and without mention of any duty to restore bene-
fits the village may have gained. 161 Contracts exceeding statu-
tory time limitations162 have been held invalid even for that
portion within the statutory limits, 1 3 since, it was reasoned, to
hold a segment valid would be to make a contract for the parties.
This rationale has not been applied, and the results have been
different, with respect to portions of contracts which did not
exceed statutory monetary limitations. 64
One common type of statutory prohibition consists of re-
strictions against public officials having an interest in public
contracts. The clearest form is a direct prohibition against such
a contract, 6 5 and an injunction has been granted against pay-
ment under one.' 66 Contracts have been found invalid, enforce-
159 State, ex rel. A. Bentley & Sons Co. v. Pierce, 96 Ohio St. 44, 117
N.E. 6 (1917); Browne v. Village of Ripley, 67 Ohio App. 112, 36 N.E.2d 50
(1940), 66 Ohio L. 261 § 660 (1869), Ohio Gen. Code 4241 (now Ohio Rev.
Code § 731.48 (1953)).
160 Newton v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 756 (Cir. Ct. 1892), aff'd,
52 Ohio St. 649, 44 N.E. 1133 (1895).
161 Village of Hicksville v. Blakeslee, 103 Ohio St. 508, 134 N.E. 445 (1921),
96 Ohio L. 54 § 101 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code § 4506 (now Ohio Rev. Code
§ 739.01 (1953)).
102 For a current example, see: Ohio Rev. Code § 743.28 (1953).
163 Manhattan Trust Co. v. City of Dayton, 59 Fed. 327 (6th Cir. 1893), 66
Ohio L. 218 § 416 (1869), Ohio Rev. Stats. § 3479 (now Ohio Rev. Code
§ 743.28 (1953)); City of Wellston v. Morgan, 59 Ohio St. 147, 52 N.E. 127
(1898), recovery of payment refused; City of Defiance v. Council of De-
fiance, 23 Ohio C.C.R. 96 (Cir. Ct. 1901), rev'd on other grounds, 68 Ohio
St. 520, 67 N.E. 1052 (1903), injunction against payment granted. However,
the company later received payment for water supplied partly on the
basis of estoppel and partly on the theory that the contract was valid so
long as the parties permitted it to run. McGonigale v. City of Defiance,
140 Fed. 621 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1905), affd, 150 Fed. 689 (5th Cir. 1907), cert.
denied, 207 U.S. 587 (1907).
164 Smith v. Village of Rockford, 9 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 465 (Cir. Ct. 1906),
aff'd, 81 Ohio St. 516, 91 N.E. 1142 (1909); Board of County Comm'rs v.
City of Norwood, 22 Ohio Op. 400 (C.P. 1942), 66 Ohio L. 186 § 217 (1869),
Ohio Gen. Code § 4126 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 753.02 (1953)).
165 88 Ohio L. 119 § 78 (1891), Bates Ohio Rev. Stats. § 1545-79.
166 City of Findlay v. Parker, 17 Ohio C.C.R. 294 (Cir. Ct. 1898), aff'd, 63
Ohio St. 565, 60 N.E. 1133 (1900).
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ment has been refused,'167 and payment has been denied' 6 when
they have been found to have been made in violation of a statute
that simply made having an interest a crime. 1 9 In a criticized 170
trial court decision, 171 the return of payments given a contractor
was refused because the city had not first restored the benefits
it had received.
Even where having an interest was prohibited but no crim-
inal penalty was prescribed, 172 an injunction has been granted
against payment under a contract in violation of the statute; 173
and payment has been refused under contracts offending this
kind of enactment. 174 Express language in the latter statute au-
thorizing recovery of payments made under a violating contract
has been used to grant recovery 175 without mention of a mu-
nicipal duty to restore what it had received.
D. Public Policy Restriction
Contracts which violate underlying principles of fairness or
good government are considered to be against public policy and
are held to be void in Ohio. Three such concepts have been the
subject of Ohio decision: conflict of interests, contracting away
of legislative power, and delegation of discretionary power.
At times both a public policy consideration and an ex-
press statutory prohibition have been involved in the same
case. In one such, it was suggested in dictum that enforcement
of the contract be denied because of the policy against a conflict
107 Halliday v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 208, 62 N.E.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1945); Bellaire Goblet Co. v. City of Findlay, 5 Ohio C.C.R. 418
(Cir. Ct. 1891); Dalzell, Gilmore & Leighton Co. v. City of Findlay, 5 Ohio
C.C.R. 435 (Cir. Ct. 1891).
168 State, ex rel. Winn v. Wichgar, 27 Ohio C.C.R. 743 (Cir. Ct. 1905).
169 Present versions of the statutes are now found in Ohio Rev. Code
§§ 2919.08, .09, .10 (1953).
170 Farrill-Eillis, Ohio Municipal Code § 8.8 (11th ed. 1962).
171 Village of Bethesda v. Mallonee, 60 Ohio Op. 107, 136 N.E.2d 457 (C.P.
1955).
172 96 Ohio L. 37, § 45 (1902), Ohio Gen. Code § 3808, as amended (now
Ohio Rev. Code §733.78 (1953)); 70 Ohio L. 195, §§31, 38 (1873), Ohio
Gen. Code § 4757 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.33 (1953)).
173 Norris v. Board of Educ., 12 Ohio L. Abs. 639 (Ct. App. 1932).
174 Petermann v. Tepe, 87 Ohio App. 487, 93 N.E.2d 328 (1949).
175 Wright v. Clark, 119 Ohio St. 462, 164 N.E. 512 (1928); Kemp v.
Lynch, 86 Ohio App. 371, 92 N.E.2d 18 (1949).
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of interest. 170 In another, an improper delegation of authority
caused the court to permit the city to recover back what it had
paid.177
Recovery on a contract which hampers or embarrasses the
future use of public legislative or administrative power has met
with refusal in one case, 17S the suggestion that it be refused in
another, 179 and the avoidance of such a result only by interpre-
tation of a state contract in still another. 8 0
Contracts found to involve an improper delegation of dis-
cretionary authority have also been held invalid, and relief under
them has been refused either because they were inconsistent
with statutory language vesting power in a particular person or
body' s or because they violated a broader principle.'8 2
E. Lack of Authority
A municipal contract may also be defective because it was
entered into by an unauthorized officer. This defect is both less
serious and more easily corrected than that of ultra vires,
since here it is not the municipal corporation who is without
authority. Many of the cases have involved either the cur-
rent' 83 or earlier analogous statutory provisions which require
express prior authorization by council before an officer can act
to bind a municipal corporation. Consequently, they could have
been included in the earlier treatment of statutory prescribed
methods of contracting. However, the results reached by
the Ohio courts in these statutory cases differ little from those
17G Halliday v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 208, 62 N.E.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1945).
177 Village of Hicksville v. Blakeslee, 103 Ohio St. 508, 134 N.E. 445 (1921).
178 Mt. Adams & E.P.I. Ry. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint
149 (Super. Ct. of Cincinnati 1891), aff'd, 52 Ohio St. 629, 44 N.E. 1145
(1894).
179 Rogers v. City of Cincinnati, 10 Ohio App. 238 (1918), also rejecting
estoppel in dictum.
180 State, ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 79 N.E.2d 127 (1948).
1s1 Board of Educ. v. Mills, 38 Ohio St. 383 (1882); State, ex rel. Manu-
facturer's Appraisal Co. v. Sayre, 33 Ohio C.C.R. 602 (Cir. Ct. 1911), aff'd,
86 Ohio St. 362, 99 N.E. 1133 (1912); Burkholder v. Lauber, 6 Ohio Misc.
152, 216 N.E.2d 909 (C.P. 1965), quasi-contractual relief also denied.
1s2 City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec-
tric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P.
1945); Ampt v. City of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio N.P. 223 (C.P. 1896), refusing
an injunction against payment because it had already been made.
183 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 735.05 (Supp. 1967), .29 (1953).
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in which subordinate personnel fail to act within their authority,
and since they all present the same basic fact pattern, they are
considered together here.
Where a lack of authority has been found the courts have
been uniform in holding that the resulting contracts, or specific
provisions of them, are invalid,1 8 4 and efforts to enforce them by
specific performance, 185 enjoining their breach,1 86 or recovery
of payments due under them,' 8 7 have failed. At the same time,
injunctions against their performance' ss and against making pay-
ments for work done under them have been granted. 189 A mu-
nicipal corporation has been denied relief on a surety's bond
when the principal contract was found to be unauthorized. 190
Estoppel has been denied,' 91 but it has also been used to permit
relief against a municipality where there was defective compli-
ance with a statutory authorization requirement.' 92
Because of the very nature of the defect, ratification by a
municipality of an unauthorized act of its agent acting on its
behalf is a well recognized theory of relief.193 Its availability ap-
pears to be readily accepted in several Ohio cases where it was
raised as an issue but the courts failed to find sufficient facts to
justify its application. 194
The Attorney General of the state has advised against the
availability of quasi-contractual relief and in favor of recovery
back by a municipality of payments made provided it restored as
far as possible benefits received under a contract which had
184 Lowry v. City of Ironton, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 222 (Ct. App. 1931); Burrows
v. City of Warren, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 539, 103 N.E.2d 311 (C.P. 1951).
1s5 Lowry v. City of Ironton, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 222 (Ct. App. 1931).
186 Village of Millersburg v. Wurdach, 22 Ohio N.P. 49 (C.P. 1919)-
187 Petermann v. Tepe, 87 Ohio App. 487, 93 N.E.2d 328 (1949); Ackley v.
Niles City Park Comm'n, 68 Ohio App. 247, 40 N.E.2d 215 (1939).
188 Helmsteder v. City of Barberton, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 447 (Ct. App. 1933).
189 Hawley v. City of Toledo, 47 Ohio App. 246, 191 N.E. 827 (1934).
190 City of Columbus v. Chicago Bonding & Sur. Co., 11 Ohio App. 42
(1918).
191 Village of Milersburg v. Wurdach, 22 Ohio N.P. 49 (C.P. 1919);
Welch v. City of Lima, 89 Ohio App. 457, 102 N.E.2d 888 (1950), where
facts did not justify its application.
192 Baxter v. Village of Manchester, 64 Ohio App. 220, 28 N.E.2d 672
(1940).
193 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.24 at 746-47 (1968).
194 Welch v. City of Lima, 89 Ohio App. 457, 102 N.E.2d 888 (1950); Ackley
v. Niles City Park Comm'n, 68 Ohio App. 247, 40 N.E.2d 215 (1939); Bur-
rows v. City of Warren, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 539, 103 N.E.2d 311 (C.P. 1951).
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been awarded without compliance with both statutory authori-
zation and certification requirements. 195
III.
The Pincelli Case
The most recent expression of the Ohio Supreme Court on
the availability of relief to a contractor under an invalid public
contract is the case of Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp.190 As stated
at the beginning of this article, this decision is noteworthy pri-
marily because of the extent to which it remains faithfully con-
sistent with the body of law just examined.
The case arose as a taxpayer's suit under statutory au-
thority' 97 to enjoin the payment of $60,556 allegedly due the de-
fendant corporation under two contracts for the supply to a
county of a pre-fabricated bridge in place and the repair of
another. In the construction of bridges, code sections 153.31 to
60,198 required preparation of plans, specifications, material lists,
advertising of an invitation for bids, and the awarding of the con-
tract to the lowest bidder. The county, however, purported to
act under the force account provisions of section 5543.19.199 Con-
sequently, the county engineer prepared the specifications, but
without having advertised for bids, he accepted the defendant's
proposal when it was found to be lower than that of another. 20 0
No certificate of availability of funds, as required by section
5705.41,201 was obtained.
The common pleas court granted the requested injunction
after it determined that the force account authority was not
simply an alternative to the formal advertising provisions of
Chapter 153 of the Ohio Revised Code which would permit the
county to "shop around and enter into a contract for some con-
tracting firm to perform the whole contract for a total set figure
195 1938 Ops. Att'y Gen. 2053.
196 5 Ohio St. 2d 41, 213 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
197 Ohio Rev. Code § 309.13 (1953).
198 Ohio Rev. Code (1953). Certain provisions of these sections have
since been superseded by Ohio Rev. Code §§ 307.86-92 (Supp. 1967).
199 Ohio Rev. Code (1953).
200 The defendant's proposal was lower for the construction contract; no
other proposal was submitted for the repair contract.
201 Ohio Rev. Code (1953).
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arrived at by the county engineer." 202 Rather, it was found to
be limited so that the county engineer was "to do the work . . .
from the labor he could hire locally and ready at hand and
available to him, and with the tools and equipment that he could
hire and the materials readily available." 203 As the basis for
granting the injunction the court relied on the authority of
State v. Kuhner & King,20 4 for the failure to obtain a certificate
of funds, and Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell,205 for the failure
to follow other statutory requirements.
The court of appeals affirmed 20° and took special note that
to decide whether the trial court's injunction was so broad as
to preclude the county's recognition of a moral obligation was
premature, since no action of recognition had been taken. The
same disposition was made of the claim that specific restitution
was available since it was not within the scope of the appeal.
The Supreme Court also affirmed. 20 7 It found that the pro-
cedure followed did not arguably amount to the proper use of
the force account method. It concluded that failure to follow
the procedure of Chapter 153 of the Ohio Revised Code, meant
that the chapter could in no way serve as legal authority for
this contract. In fact, it found the purchase orders were not
authorized by any statute and, therefore, relying on the Bu-
chanan case, "no contract authorizing the expenditure of public
202 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 165, 178, 198 N.E.2d 483,
490 (C.P. 1964).
203 Id. at 175, 198 N.E.2d at 48B. Apparently in response to the suggestions
of the court of appeals in Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 1 Ohio App.2d
342, 343, 345, 204 N.E.2d 696, 697, 698 (1965), the legislature has clarified
the applicability of force account procedure by amending Ohio Rev. Code
§5543.19 (Supp. 1967), effective December 9, 1967. This section now pro-
vides that force account is not available if the estimate of the work to be
done by the county on bridges and culverts exceeds $25,000 unless no bid
is received or all bids are rejected.
Sections 307.86-92 Ohio Rev. Code (Supp. 1967), which impose com-
petitive bidding procedures, are also newly adopted, having taken effect
on the same day as Ohio Rev. Code §5543.19 (Supp. 1967). They are
broad in scope, covering all purchases, leases, or construction carried out
by a county. They thus supersede certain provisions of Ohio Rev. Code
§§ 153.31-.60 (1953). The new sections exclude contracts of $2,000 or less,
and certain service contracts (§307.86), and provide for several other
exceptions, e.g., emergency construction (§307.86(A)), or purchases from
other governmental bodies (§ 307.86(C)).
204 107 Ohio St. 406, 140 N.E. 344 (1923).
205 60 Ohio St. 406, 54 N.E. 372 (1899).
206 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 1 Ohio App.2d 342, 204 N.E.2d 696
(1965).
207 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 5 Ohio St2d 41, 213 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
Fall, 196h
33
Vaubel: Relief Under Defective Municipal Contract
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1969
RELIEF UNDER DEFECTIVE MUNICIPAL CONTRACT
funds resulted." 2018 In its syllabus, the court approved and fol-
lowed this case by stating that competitive bidding requirements
of Chapter 153, Ohio Revised Code, were mandatory and a con-
tract made without compliance with them was void. The court
went on to note that the failure to obtain a certificate of funds
also resulted in making the contract void according to the ex-
press terms of section 5705.41,209 and as they were construed in
State v. Kuhner & King.210 Finally the court failed to find any
justification to the claim that the taxpayer's suit came too late
since statutory provisions of section 309.13,211 did not limit such
a suit to the time before work was completed.
In this case there was a complete lack of compliance with
applicable statutory procedures unrelieved by even a colorable
claim to a right to use the force account method of contracting.
This would serve to overcome any judicial hesitancy, noted
earlier, in granting the stringent relief of an injunction against
payments. As a consequence, the approach of all three courts to
this case and the results they reached are in no way unjustified,
either in light of the precedent they cited or other precedent
available to them. In this regard the case adds no new law to the
Ohio scene. (The suggestion by the Supreme Court concerning
recognition by a public body of a moral obligation will be treated
later.) The case only reiterates in a more modern setting the
courts' older views on the significance of these statutes. But this
result is significant, for it means that the suggestions of some
legal scholars212 and the liberalizing decisions of some courts in
other states213 have not had sufficient impact on the Supreme
Court to cause it to expand its opinion to include a restatement
of the rationale behind the results reached, let alone a reconsid-
eration of its merits. It also means that the changes that have
been wrought by modern urban society have had no discernible
effect on the Court; nor has the passage of time induced a re-
examination of past precedent for possible misconceptions or
208 Id. at 45, 213 N.E.2d at 360.
209 Ohio Rev. Code (1953).
210 107 Ohio St. 406, 140 N.E. 344 (1923).
211 Ohio Rev. Code (1953).
212 Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47
Harv. Rev. 1143 (1934); Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-Contractual
Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations, 2 St. Louis U.L.J. 230 (1953);
Comment, Municipal Liability Upon Improperly Executed Contracts, 1 Du-
quesne U.L. Rev. 221 (1963).
213 Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47
Harv. Rev. 1143, 1168 (1934).
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over-emphases. Although this may not have been the appropriate
case, or an appropriate time, for a massive re-examination of
this subject by the Supreme Court, there certainly was no in-
dication that it has any immediate desire to undertake such an
effort. If, as suggested in the treatment of Lathrop Co. v. City
of Toledo2 14 the Court may be inclined to temper the harshness
of the law in this area, this is not indicated in the Pincelli case.
IV.
Criticisms of Restrictive Decisions
The rationales underlying the broad areas treated, such as
ultra vires, statutory prohibitions, and statutory modes of con-
tracting, in themselves justify refusal to enforce offending con-
tracts by either injunction or damage awards for their breach.
They also serve as compelling reasons against overlooking com-
mon factual deficiencies by liberalizing the application of the
theories of ratification and estoppel to indirectly achieve the
same result. Certainly, policy considerations in favor of pro-
tecting the taxpayer and the public treasury do nothing but
re-enforce such a denial. But the strong principles of fairness
and justice which serve as the basis for the concept of unjust
enrichment, the cornerstone of the law of restitution, militate
against a similar denial of quasi-contractual relief based on the
reasonable value of the materials or services rendered. To give
effect to such a fair and flexible theory of relief does no violence
to the above rationales. It should, therefore, be rejected only if
it would tend to defeat the objectives sought to be achieved by
their development, and more particularly, those implicit in the
passage of statutory provisions. This is the approach suggested
by the writers of the Restatement.215
Fully in accord with the spirit of this approach, Professor
Chester J. Antieau, one of the leading writers in this field,
suggests that quasi-contractual relief be made available to con-
tractors despite the fact that the contract is ultra vires, 216 vio-
lates public policy,217 or was awarded by an unauthorized
214 5 Ohio St.2d 165, 214 N.E.2d 408 (1966).
215 Restatement of Restitution § 62 (1937).
216 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.12 at 708-11 (1968).
217 Id. at § 10.15 at 719; Id. at § 10.22 at 739.
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agent.2 18 He would have courts deny its application only where
statutory provisions make this imperative. This suggestion is
not without judicial support, for although probably a majority of
courts do deny this relief in these areas, there are many who
do not.219 With respect to statutory requirements concerning the
manner of contracting, Professor Antieau suggests no generali-
zation be made but that each statute and requirement be tested
in light of the following considerations before quasi-contract is
denied:
Rather than indulging in such labels, the judiciary should
be encouraged to a conscious awareness and weighing of
the social purpose underlying the statute or charter pro-
vision, the persons intended to be protected thereby, a
consideration of whether the legislative aims can be reason-
ably attained while granting some form of relief to the
citizen, the degree of deception or bad faith of the local gov-
ernment agents and officers in the particular transaction, the
extent of culpable carelessness on the part of the private
party, the possibilities of restoration to the status quo, and
in general, the possibility of enforcing society's strong policy
against unjust enrichment. 220
In the absence of countervailing considerations operating in
a particular state, there is the further suggestion that quasi-
contract be made available to contractors even though require-
ments of advertising for bids,2 21 prior authorization or ap-
proval,222 recording of contracts, 223 prior appropriation, 224 or cer-
tificate of funds,22 5 were not met. Again, there is considerable
judicial support for such relief in these circumstances, 2 6 reach-
ing trend227 or even majority228 proportions.
218 Id. at § 10.24 at 749.
219 Id. at § 10.12 at 708-11; at § 10.14 at 717; at § 10.15 at 719; at § 10.22
at 738; at § 10.24 at 748-49.
220 Id. at § 10.26 at 752.
221 Id. at § 10.27 at 756.
222 Id. at § 10.47 at 785.
223 Id. at § 10.49 at 788.
224 Id. at § 10.50 at 790.
225 Id. at § 10.50 at 791.
226 Id. at § 10.49 at 787-88; at § 10.50 at 789-91.
227 Id. § 10.27 at 754-56, formal advertising.
22S Id. § 10.47 at 785, authorization by ordinance.
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Insofar as these requirements are motivated by a desire to
protect the public treasury and thereby the taxpayer from ex-
cessive prices, granting quasi-contractual relief would do no dis-
service as an indirect raid on the treasury. The municipality
would be liable only for the value it had received. A value
computed by a competent judicial system based on relatively
clear principles of long standing. The "water" resulting from
favoritism, negligence, excessive advantages, or any advantages
of the bargain at all, would be wrung out in the granting of this
relief. That these evils might not be prevented, is true, but cer-
tainly, their primary cause would be.
2 29
Extravagant spending beyond municipal needs or the capa-
bilities to pay might be advanced if adherence to the prior au-
thorization 230 and certification of funds requirements were en-
dangered. However, if a contractor were to become a willing
partner to such a practice he would continue to run the risk
of no recovery for the benefit conferred if, as suggested, his
culpability were considered as one of the determinates of relief.
If an innocent victim of the expansive ambitions of the mu-
nicipal officials, denial or relief to him would penalize one who
had no influence in causing the transgression, and would not
serve as an effective deterrent to those responsible, the municipal
authorities. Reliance would better be placed on improving the
more carefully directed deterrent of effective administrative pro-
cedures if scrutiny by the electorate, implemented directly and
more immediately by the availability of a taxpayer's injunction
suit, are thought insufficient.
There is the possibility that the denial of all relief will serve
to heighten the contractor's caution in entering contracts with
public bodies and will thereby cause him to shoulder the bur-
den of seeing to it that municipal authorities act within their
229 Some still find in the presence of profit in quantum meruit, i.e. the dif-
ference between expenses and market value, sufficient reason to deny quasi-
contractual relief in order to prevent the breakdown in the safeguard
against favoritism, fraud, and corruption erected by advertising require-
ments. Case Note, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 591, 595 (1958). Others emphasize the
loss of product improvement with the curtailment of competition. Wessells,
Stimulate Competition on Public Business, 74 Am. City 160 (April 1959).
230 Contracting without authorization by council would be destructive of
councilmanic control over a vital area of municipal government. How
common a practice this might become, despite all possible administrative
safeguards, if quasi-contractual relief were granted, is a question that
needs to be considered.
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power and in the manner prescribed. No doubt this is a possible
result. But, aside from the fact that at times this is a very
heavy burden indeed, and increasingly so in the complexities of
modern purchasing, it would appear to be a misplaced one. As
already stated, efforts at improving administrative procedures
would be more to the point. Then too, the ultimate responsibility
of supervision is the electorate's. If its opportunity to elect hon-
est and competent officials and its ability to institute taxpayer's
injunctive suits are not adequate to prevent municipal abuse,
shifting the consequences of this deficiency to the contractor as
an insurer of public well-being is at best a stopgap, and certainly
an unfair one, at that.
It might well be concluded that a denial of all relief and
even the ordering of the return to the municipality of benefits
conferred by it are both an ineffective way to advance municipal
honesty, integrity, or efficiency, and often constitute a clear in-
justice to good faith municipal contractors.2 3 1
Clearly, the Ohio picture fails to meet these criticisms. As
has been seen, instead of examining the merits of each case-
including the culpabilities of the parties, the particular policies
to be advanced, and the specific language of pertinent statutes-
the courts have been stiflingly uniform in denying all quasi-
contractual relief, generally after first denying other theories or
forms of recovery. This uniformity of result is the unfortunate
consequence of the Supreme Court's apparent misconception in
the Morgan case23 2 that quasi-contract is a form of contract
rather than simply a form of relief. This situation exists despite
some tendency to mitigate its severity by granting the incomplete
remedy of specific restitution, by demanding the restoration of
benefits before allowing the municipality to recover back those
conferred by it, by occasionally applying estoppel, and by some-
times refusing to enjoin payment for work done. This is not to
suggest that quasi-contract should be granted in all cases, for
this would indicate as much insensitivity to the specifics of each
case as does the present policy of uniformly denying relief.
Rather, an evaluation of all relevant factors, including legisla-
tive intent and public policy considerations, is imperative. Re-
sults should not depend on an unimaginative following of
231 Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 1143, 1169-70 (1934).
232 City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Ohio St. 219, 62 N.E. 127 (1901).
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precedent or a heavy reliance on mere labels. As a practical
matter, a major shift in approach by the Ohio courts would seem
highly unlikely, given the past history of this problem. Even if
the courts were receptive to a change, in some instances statu-
tory language would stand in the way. It is therefore apparent
that resort must be had to the legislature if corrective action is
to be undertaken.
V.
Moral Obligation
Before the unhappy plight of a municipal contractor can be
confirmed and the resulting criticisms can be established, an ex-
amination of a further matter must be made. This is the extent
to which a municipality is empowered to make compensation
without legal compulsion for benefits received. Certainly, there
must be made, as an incident to this examination, an estimate of
the relative merit of this approach as compared to that of granting
judicial relief-that is, between recovery as a matter of grace
and as a matter of legal right. It is also with respect to this con-
sideration that the Pincelli233 case may have its greatest im-
portance.
The administrative or legislative approach to relief (as con-
trasted with the judicial one) is not new. In fact, until modern
statutes waived immunity it was the only means available to
obtain relief against the federal government. At the municipal
level recognition of a claim can take two possible forms, that of
corrective legislation at the initiative of the state, 234 or at the in-
itiative of the municipal corporation. The latter form is of pri-
mary concern here-general or piecemeal recognition of a moral
duty by a municipal council to make compensation for a benefit
received or an injury caused by the municipality for which it is
not legally liable.235 As a form of relief this approach has both
advantages and shortcomings for a municipal contractor. If no
233 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 5 Ohio St.2d 41, 213 N.E.2d 356 (1966).
234 State, ex rel. Uible v. Harlan, 37 Ohio App. 222, 174 N.E. 366 (1930);
Mill Creek Valley St. Ry. v. Village of Carthage, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 216 (Cir.
Ct. 1899), aff'd, 62 Ohio St. 636, 58 N.E. 1102 (1900). This power is limited
so that it can not be used to benefit only the state and be detrimental only
to the contractor. State v. Kuhner & King, 107 Ohio St. 406, 140 N.E. 344(1923).
235 "A 'moral obligation' means that some direct benefit was received
by the state as a state or some direct injury has been suffered by the
(Continued on next page)
Fall, 1968
39
Vaubel: Relief Under Defective Municipal Contract
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1969
RELIEF UNDER DEFECTIVE MUNICIPAL CONTRACT
other relief is available, it is a clear gain, but in comparison to
judicial relief as a matter of right, it suffers from its voluntari-
ness and unpredictability. Arguably, however, being at the
mercy of a municipal administrator or a municipal council is no
worse than being at the mercy of a jury. It is true that factors
irrelevant to the claim may enter into treatment by the mu-
nicipality, such as the closeness of an election, the end of the
fiscal year, or even the personality of the aggrieved contractor.
However, the apparent stability and predictability of legal relief
may easily run aground on the shoals of jury capriciousness.
Legislative relief is characterized as inferior by one legal
writer 236 and preferable by some municipal administrators.237
Whichever is more nearly true, recognition of a moral obligation
by a municipality is clearly an ameliorating factor, one neces-
sitated by the unsatisfactory state of the law in this area.
Yet, at the same time, it constitutes an incongruity in the pat-
tern. Courts have denied municipal legislative correction by
ratification because of a lack of power. They have stopped short
of accepting judicially recognized administrative correction
through the use of the theory of estoppel. They have declined
to recognize judicial power to take corrective action through
the application of quasi-contractual relief. It is therefore remark-
able that they should accept the theory that the municipality
has power to make amends by acknowledging a moral obligation.
The recognition of a moral obligation cannot even be dis-
tinguished entirely from the other theories on the basis of mu-
nicipal willingness to make an adjustment. But insofar as such
a distinction can be drawn between that approach and quasi-
contract, municipal amenability to liability has, by itself, no
bearing on the justice of the claim, the plight of the contractor,
or the policy of the statute. The former approach may involve
(Continued from preceding page)
claimant under circumstances where in fairness the state might be asked
to respond, and there must be something more than a mere gratuity in-
volved.'" It is "'a duty which would be enforceable at law were it not for
some positive rule which exempts the party in that particular instance
from legal liability.'" State, ex rel. Caton v. Anderson, 159 Ohio St. 159,
163, 111 N.E.2d 248, 250 (1953).
236 Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 1143, 1171 (1934).
237 This view was expressed by at least some in response to a questionnaire
concerning municipal practices and opinions with respect to the payment
of moral claims against a municipality which was distributed to a number
of municipal law directors in Ohio by the author.
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just as great a raid on the treasury and just as improper an ex-
penditure of tax money as may the latter. Given the justice of
the claim, the question resolves itself into whether the contractor
should be placed at the tender mercies of municipal authorities
or those of a jury. Clearly, if the latter remedy is to be denied,
the former is certainly better than nothing. But if municipal
relief is justified, what prevents acceptance of judicial remedies?
Is the concept of moral obligation recognized in Ohio? The
answer to this question was at best clouded prior to the Pincelli
case, and that decision may have succeeded in adding to the ob-
scurity.
The concept is well recognized in the adjudication of tort
claims at the state level,23 s and since 1953 it has been recog-
nized at the municipal level that "(t) he city may be just..." 2.9
There is nothing in the Caton case which would deny its appli-
cation to contract claims. In fact, there is scattered but incon-
clusive judicial support for such an application. 240 There can be
238 Spitzig v. State, ex rel. Hile, 119 Ohio St. 117, 162 N.E. 394 (1928).
239 State, ex rel. Caton v. Anderson, 159 Ohio St. 159, 164, 111 N.E.2d 248,
251 (1953). This power, too, is limited so that the point of a gift is reached
by repeated payments of the same claim. Peters v. State, ex rel. Jaehn, 42
Ohio App. 307, 182 N.E. 139 (1932).
24o) Some is to be found in dictum at the Supreme Court level in Emmert
v. City of Elyria, 74 Ohio St. 185, 78 N.E. 269 (1906), where the court
used moral obligation as the basis for its reluctance to enjoin the city
from making payment for benefits received under a contract thought not
to be void even though awarded without a certification of funds. More, but
also by way of dictum, appears in another case in which injunctive relief
was sought: Caldwell v. Marvin, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 387 (C.P. 1909). But
still another trial court, in Maloney v. Gutelius, 16 Ohio Op. 145 (C.P.
1939), while granting an injunction against payment, took note of the
undercutting effect the recognition of a moral obligation has on the re-
quirements of ratification and suggested, again in dictum, that recovery
be limited to legal claims.
Actual holdings on the question of moral obligation have been few
and conflicting. Several cases in part support such recovery. In one,
Arnold v. City of Akron, 54 Ohio App. 382, 7 N.E.2d 660 (1936), the court
refused an injunction against payment for lack of a certificate of funds, but
also relied on the theory of ratification. In another, State, ex rel. Morgan
v. Rusk, 37 Ohio App. 109, 174 N.E. 142 (1930), the court granted relief
in part on the theory that there was an enforceable contract. In a third,
State, ex rel. German American Publishing & Printing Co. v. Wall, 2 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 517 (C.P. 1902), the contract violated charter provisions. The
power to recognize a moral obligation was denied in Caster v. Village of
Pleasant Ridge, 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 174 (C.P. 1907), where an injunction
against payment was granted because of a total disregard of statutory re-
quirements. In Village of Pleasant Ridge v. Dayton Limestone Co., 1 Ohio
App. 405 (1913), the appeals court, in overturning a trial court decision
permitting the contractor relief on the basis of a moral obligation (despite
(Continued on next page)
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no doubt that many municipal authorities consider themselves
empowered to give such relief (usually in a piecemeal fashion)
in contract claims, although some apparently still do not do
S0.241 This belief is supported by the approach taken by the
Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices of the
state auditor's office in its acceptance of such expenditures242
in the course of carrying out its statutory243 duty to examine
municipal accounts.
Still, the Supreme Court in Pincelli can reasonably be in-
terpreted as having cast doubt on the validity of this practice.
The question is not thoroughly discussed by the court, a fact
which makes one hesitant to state any firm conclusions. Also,
the appeals court had noted that a decision on the moral obliga-
tion issue was premature, since such an obligation had not been
recognized by the county. Yet, the Supreme Court stated in its
decision that statutory authority for taxpayers to prevent by in-
junction the expenditure of county money 244 (and the same
would likely be true with respect to municipal money 24 5 ) "makes
untenable the position . . that payment can be made on a basis
of moral obligation." 246 It seems that a taxpayer's request for
an injunction, which in the past had met with judicial hesitancy
and statements favorable to a municipal power to recognize a
moral obligation, may now meet with success.
Even though purely a matter of statutory interpretation, and
apparently only dictum at that, this statement could have major
ramifications. Given a narrow construction, it may mean merely
that recognition of a moral obligation could be prevented by a
taxpayer's suit such as the one before the court. This may have
(Continued from preceding page)
a lack of a certificate of funds and of advertising) found the municipality's
defense of the suit indicated that the village was actually resisting pay-
ment. However, there was also a defect in the village's attempt to recog-
nize the obligation. Doubt as to the authority of a municipality to recog-
nize a moral obligation in a defective contract was expressed by the At-
torney General of the state in 1938 Ops. Att'y Gen. 2053, at 510.
241 This is evident from a number of replies obtained in the survey men-
tioned in note 237, supra.
242 From a statement made in a letter from the Bureau's office to the
author, dated June 19, 1968.
243 Ohio Rev. Code § 117.10 (1953).
244 Ohio Rev. Code § 309.13 (1953).
245 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 733.56, .59 (Supp. 1967).
246 Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp., 5 Ohio St.2d 41, 46, 213 N.E.2d 356, 360
(1966).
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been the law previously, although no case has come to the
author's attention in which this issue was presented. On the
other hand, the statement might be given a broader interpreta-
tion, namely, that a moral obligation cannot be recognized in any
case in which a taxpayer's suit could be brought, that is, any
case involving the illegal expenditure of public funds-including
payments made under an invalid contract. It seems clear that if
either interpretation is correct and becomes authoritative in
future decisions, the body of Ohio municipal contract law will
thereby become more consistent, but at the same time it will
become even more inflexible and unfair to the municipal con-
tractor.
VI.
Conclusion
Under Ohio law a municipal contractor is almost entirely
unable to enforce a defective contract with the municipality,
whatever the nature of the defect. Only those flaws caused by
a violation of the most technical statutory requirements have
given rise to different treatment. Recovery for the value of work
or materials supplied is also generally denied, regardless of the
theory of relief employed or the nature of the defect involved.
However, estoppel has been given limited application, particu-
larly in the case of unconstitutional grants of authority or the
issuance of a false certificate of funds. Ratification is also avail-
able in cases involving unauthorized agents. Specific restitution
of benefits has been suggested on occasion. Injunctions against
payment are generally granted, but some hesitancy is evident
when defective advertising or the failure to procure a certificate
of the availability of funds is involved. In addition, a duty to
restore benefits conferred on a municipality is generally treated
as a condition to the statutory right of a municipality to recover
back benefits it has given the contractor.
Ohio courts have stood steadfast against the granting of
quasi-contractual relief when statutory requirements for con-
tracting have not been followed. This is explained as being
necessary in order to sustain and support the policies which pre-
sumably motivated the legislature to establish the requirements.
Developed early, this approach has been consistently reaffirmed,
even in the most recent case of Pincelli v. Ohio Bridge Corp.
247
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However, this case may well constitute more than just a re-
affirmation of precedent, for it casts doubt on the validity of mu-
nicipal efforts to alleviate the inequities involved in denying
legal relief by recognizing a moral obligation to pay for benefits
received under otherwise unenforceable contracts.
The denial of quasi-contractual relief and the possible denial
(by Pincelli) of a municipality's right to recognize a moral obli-
gation to pay have severely curtailed the ability of any public
body (short of the state legislature) to fit the remedy to the
situation and thereby to achieve a result which is fair to both
the contractor and the public. This state of affairs is manifestly
unsatisfactory, and there is clearly a need for remedial action by
the General Assembly.
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